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Abstract
This doctoral dissertation examines the impact of product market competition on the cash
flow investments and risk. The dissertation is comprised of three essays. First essay investigates
the link between a firm’s competitive environment and the ratio of idiosyncratic volatility to
systematic volatility. I postulate that competition has a higher effect on idiosyncratic volatility than
the systematic volatility for two reasons. First, market power works as a tool that passes on firmspecific cost shocks to customers but is irrelevant to passing on the industry-wide cost shocks.
Second, firm’s competitive advantage relative to its peers in the industry is affected by changes in
firm-specific costs rather than by the industry-wide costs. The effect of firm-specific costs on
competitive advantage is expected to be larger when there are many rivals in the industry.
Accordingly, I find that competition increases the idiosyncratic volatility more significantly than
the systematic volatility. Given that R-square is a function of these two risks, the results show that
economy-wide competition plays a role in explaining the R-square. The second essay examines
the effect of product market competition on cash-flow investments. Given that competition
increases financial constraints, as indicated by several recent studies, I claim that competition may
prevent firms from undertaking valuable investments using the cash flow. The results are
consistent with this prediction as I find that competition exacerbates the effect of financial
constraints and reduces the investment of cash flow in valuable projects. I also show that the
financial constraints of competition, and not the competition per se, perform a major disciplinary
role of reducing overinvestment. Therefore, our perception to competition as a corporate
governance tool could have been overestimated. The third essay investigates the effect of product
market competition on the exposure of firms’ return to consumption fluctuation (C-CAPM beta).
This kind of exposure is considered a main determinant of the security’s systematic risk. I find that
higher competition reduces C-CAPM beta. This result is attributed to the output reaction by firms
in competitive industries to consumption fluctuation as opposed to price reaction by firms in lowcompetition industries. The findings of this essay are in contrast to prior studies that document a
vi

positive association between competition and systematic risk. While these studies applied standard
CAPM to measure the systematic risk, my study applies Consumption-CAPM.
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Chapter 1: essay 1-product market competition, idiosyncratic volatility and
systematic risk
1.1 INTRODUCTION

Firm’s risk does not only depend on its own financing and investment decisions but also
on its rivals strategies and actions. Firms are in constant battle with each other to get the largest
market share in the industry. According to many studies, competition intensity raises firm’s
business risk and cash flow volatility (e.g., Subrahmanyam and Thomadakis (1980), Moyer and
Chatfield (1983), Bernier (1987), Hou and Robinson (2006), Gasper and Masa (2006), Irvine and
Pontiff (2009)). While many studies documented the effect the intensity of competition has on
firms’ return volatility and risk, the effect of competition on the ratio of idiosyncratic volatility to
systematic volatility is unclear.
Generally, monopoly power may enable firms to pass on any cost increase to consumers
by charging higher prices. Yet, economic theory suggests that this ability is only relevant for
reducing the effect of firm-specific cost shocks and not the industry-wide cost changes. That is,
the compensation for the industry-wide cost changes via the increase in price level is not a function
of competition level or monopoly power. Consequently, the changes in idiosyncratic risk could be
larger than those of systematic risk when competition intensity varies. Another reason that may
lead to the same conclusion is related to the effect of firm-specific risk on the firm’s relative
performance in industry. Changes in firm-specific costs will influence the firm’s competitive
position, but this is not the case for the changes in industry-wide costs. Practically, firms operating
in the same industry behave strategically with one another, thus creating inter-firm dependencies
in operational decisions (Hao, Jin and Zhang, 2011). If firm’s return is driven by the market share
then its return is affected by the performance of other firms, thus creating inter-firm stock return
dependencies. In other words, the success of one firm in an industry comes at the expense of
another firm in that industry. As such, if one firm incurs losses due to firm-specific event then
1

other firms may gain by diverting the market shares to themselves when they lower their prices.
This in turn may increase the chances of driving out the firm from its business if firm-specific
costs get much out of line with those of its competitors.
In this essay, I examine the impact of competition on idiosyncratic volatility relative to its
impact on systematic volatility. According to my argument, competition should cause a higher
increase in idiosyncratic volatility. Using a sample of firms in the CRSP/COMPUSTAT Merged
Database over the period of 2005-2014, I find strong empirical support for this hypothesis. I use
the Herfindahl–Hirschman index to measure the competition intensity and the Fama–French threefactor model to measure the idiosyncratic and systematic volatility. After controlling for a host of
variables that the existing literature shows to have an effect on return volatility, as well as
controlling for firm and time fixed effects, the estimates are highly significant.
I also perform two additional analyses to verify my findings. First, I exploit the changes of
industry-level import tariff to identify those industries that witnessed a falling trade barriers which
consequently resulted in tougher competition condition. To achieve this, I use annual tariff data
for the U.S. manufacturing sector, between 1989 and 2005 to identify industries that faced an
import tariff reduction. Consistent with our main results, the increase in idiosyncratic volatility is
significantly larger than the increase in systematic volatility. Second, I use the average pair-wise
co-movements as a different way to measure the change in systematic volatility relative to the
change in idiosyncratic volatility. Return pair-wise correlation can be viewed as the proportion of
the shared variation between the return of any two stocks to their total return variation. The total
return variation is simply the summation of systematic and idiosyncratic volatility. This suggests
that if competition induces a greater increase in idiosyncratic volatility then the return pair-wise
correlation should decline. When I compare between the average of pair-wise return comovements before and after the reduction in tariff rates, I find that, on average, the pair-wise
correlation goes down, lending more support to the main hypothesis.
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A number of studies have investigated the relationship between product market
competition and firm risk. Gasper and Masa (2006) show that competition reduces firm-level
idiosyncratic risk while Irvine and Pontiff (2009) suggest that competition could be related to
cross-country differences in the idiosyncratic risk and R-square. Other studies focused on the effect
of competition on systematic risk rather than the idiosyncratic risk. Subrahmanyam and
Thomadakis (1980) provide theoretical reasoning which demonstrates that firms with higher
(lower) monopoly power exhibit lower (higher) betas, or systematic risk. Moyer and Chatfield
(1983) and Bernier (1987) find an empirical support for the positive effect of competition on the
systematic risk. This essay complements and extends this literature by demonstrating the influence
of competition on idiosyncratic risk compared to its effect on systematic risk.
There is a growing literature that attempts to document the trend in idiosyncratic and
systematic (or market) volatility. Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) document an
increasing firm-level return volatility but stable market and industry return volatilities over the
period from 1962 to 1997. Kearney and Poti (2008) find a rise in both idiosyncratic volatility and
market risk in euro area stock markets over the period 1974–2004. Gokgoz and Altintas (2012)
studied the behavior of idiosyncratic volatility and its forecasting ability in predicting the future
return in Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE). Their results reveal that idiosyncratic volatility is the
biggest component of total volatility and show no trend during the sample period (2009-2011).
Sault (2005) investigates Australian market firm level volatility from 1973 to 2003 period by using
Campbell’s methodology and found downward trend in market, industry and firm level volatility.
Xu (2009) analyzed the volatilities at market-level as well as at the firm-level between 1991 and
2005 in the Hong Kong stock market and found that the firm-level and market-level return
volatilities have been increasing before 2002. This article argues that competitive conduct has a
greater influence on the firm level volatility rather than the industry or market level volatility,
which may explain why firm level volatility during the sample period to some of these studies has
a discernible trend, thereby providing a simple economic story to these studies.
3

The results are particularly relevant for two reasons. First, they are important for
understanding the mechanism to reduce the major risk that emerges after implementing many
policy decisions that aim to increase competition, (e.g. industrial deregulation and trade
agreements). Theoretically, idiosyncratic volatility can be eliminated in a well-diversified
portfolio, yet investors may not be able to do so due to several reasons such as wealth constraints
and transaction costs. As such, reducing idiosyncratic volatility could be crucial in competitive
markets and may play an important role in lowering risk and hence the cost of equity. Malkiel and
Xu (2003) show that idiosyncratic volatility can explain cross-sectional differences in return of
individual stocks. Given that competition relates stronger to the firm-specific volatility, it may be
more important to focus on tools that enhance the investment diversification.
Second, this study may demonstrate the effect of competition on R-square over time and
across countries. Campbell et al. (2001) finds a noticeable increase in firm-level volatility relative
to market volatility in the United States from 1960 to 1997. Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) show
that stock-return R-square is higher in countries with more opaque information environments and
in countries with relatively low per-capita GDP and less developed financial systems. Irvine and
Pontiff (2009) argue that information opacity deters a country’s product-market competition which
in turn raises stock-return R-square. They claim that low intensity of competition is the reason
behind the high R-square and not the information opacity which is associated with low product
market competition. However, in order to validate the claim that competition reduces R-square,
we need to compare between the effect of competition on both the firm-specific (or idiosyncratic)
risk and the systematic risk. This essay asserts this claim as it shows that the increase in firmspecific risk is higher than the systematic risk when competition intensity rises.

1.2 EXPLANATIONS FOR THE MAIN HYPOTHESIS
As I argue in this essay, competition is expected to increase idiosyncratic volatility more
than the systematic volatility. I provide two explanations that may justify this argument.
4

A. Pass-through channel explanation
The economic theory suggests that firms may be able to pass on costs to consumers by
raising the price. I define two main costs that may affect any firm in the industry or market. First,
the firm-specific costs which are associated with a particular firm. Second, the industry (or market)
wide costs that are associated with all firms in the industry/market and are thus of a systematic
nature. A firm may be able to pass on systematic cost shocks to its consumers whether the market
structure in which it operates is competitive or not. In contrast, firm ability to pass on firm-specific
cost shocks hinges mainly upon the market structure.1 In particular, a firm acting in a highly
competitive industry can not raise the price as customers can obtain a lower-cost substitute
product.2 A firm in concentrated industry, on the other hand, can pass on firm-specific cost shocks
because customers may be unable to resort to substitutes from rivals to escape the price rise.
Therefore, firms enjoying monopoly power, or established in concentrated industries, may have
greater ability to pass on the increase in firm-specific cost to consumers. Consequently, a lower
monopoly power will reduce mainly the ability to pass on the firm-specific cost shocks. The net
result is that the competition will raise the firm-specific risk more than the systematic risk.
B. Firm’s rank based explanation
A firm’s risk and the related probability of distress could be a function of the firm’s
performance ranking within industry. For example, borrowing and financing costs could be lower
for firms with the highest performance rank in their industry. Jennings, Seo and Soliman (2015)
1 For comprehensive and up-to-date review of the literature on the causes and consequences of differences in cost
pass-through and their measurement, see “Cost pass-through: theory, measurement, and potential policy
implications” A Report prepared for the Office of Fair Trading (2014).
2

Ashenfelter et.al, (1998) show that in the limiting case of perfect competition, the firm-specific pass-through rate
goes to zero, indicating that price varies only with industry-wide shocks to marginal cost, not with variation in firmspecific costs.
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find evidence that investors positively value improvements in the firm’s performance ranking
within the industry. Their results suggest that the firm’s industry ranking constitutes an additional
and relevant benchmark for investors and managers. Moreover, a firm with a low ranking among
its peers could be easily displaced by potential competitors. As such, firm's position relative to its
peers in the industry can play an important role in the firm’s competitive advantage. Firm’s ranking
can be driven primarily by changes in firm-specific costs rather than by the industry-wide costs.
This due to the fact that the former affects a particular firm while the latter affects all firms in the
industry. Therefore, an increase in firm-specific cost will lower a firm’s ranking as these costs get
much out of line with those of its competitors who are not affected by the cost increase. However,
if the cost is industry-wide then the firm’s ranking may not change as the costs impact all firms in
the industry. As argued in this essay, competition would magnify the impact of firm-specific cost
shocks on firms’ ranking. The extreme cases of market structure offers a good illustration of what
I have in mind. Let’s assume there are two firms, one is operating in pure monopoly market while
the other is operating in pure competition market. An increase in firm-specific cost will not affect
the ranking of the firm in the monopoly industry because there are no rivals. However, the same
increase in firm-specific cost may significantly lower the ranking of the firm in pure competition
industry. On the other hand, industry wide cost shocks may not affect the firm’s ranking in
monopoly industry- again because there are no rivals- or in pure competition industry because
rivals are also affected by the same cost shock.

1.3 SAMPLE AND VARIABLES
The total volatility of individual stocks can be decomposed into systematic and
idiosyncratic volatility. To estimate the systematic volatility, we need to use a model that defines
the systematic risk factors. The residuals from the factor model can be then used to estimate the
idiosyncratic volatility. Fama–French three-factor model is considered one of the most well-known
models which estimates the excess return based on three factors namely: (i): excess market
6

portfolio return; (ii): the difference between the excess return on a portfolio of small stocks and
the excess return on a portfolio of big stocks (SMB, small minus big); and (iii) the difference
between the excess return on a portfolio of high-book-to-market stocks and the excess return on a
portfolio of low-book-to-market stocks (HML, high minus low). They formulate their model as:

Ri,t - Rf,t=αi +βiM (RMt-Rf,t) + βiSMBRSMBt + βiHMLRHMLt +ri,t

(1.1)

Where

Ri,t: Rate of return of firm i at time t.
Rf,t: Risk-free rate of return at time t.
RMt: Rate of return of market portfolio.
RSMBt: The difference between the excess return on a portfolio of small stocks and the excess
return on a portfolio of big stocks.

RHML: The difference between the excess return on a portfolio of high-book-to-market stocks and
the excess return on a portfolio of low-book-to-market stocks.

ri,t : is the error term , which reflects the firm specific risk.
Another factor model that is still used in this application is the capital asset pricing model
of William Sharpe (1964) and John Lintner (1965). That model states that the risk of stock is
measured relative to market portfolio and thus considers only the proxy for the market return (RMt)
as the only determinant of the stock excess return. The focus on the three-factor model is based on
the recent finding which shows that product market competition erodes the value of growth
options, making the firm possess a lower loading on HML factor (Bustamante and Donangelo,
2014). Similarly, if competition reduces a firm size then it may increase the loading on the size
factor (SMB). In fact, the results show that this is the case. It is worth noting that including size
7

and book to market variables in the regression between return volatility and competition may not
capture the impact of risk factors (HML and SMB). As such, it may be crucial to include the HML
and SMB factor loadings from the three Fama-Factor model, along with size and market to book
ratio, when the regression between return volatility and competition intensity is estimated.
I square the 36 monthly residuals from Equation (1.1) to calculate idiosyncratic return
volatility at time t. I use monthly return instead of daily return because most of the studies in this
area use the former (see for example Fama and Macbeth 1973). I find the yearly beta for firm i
(yearly idiosyncratic volatility) by taking the average of 12 monthly betas (12 monthly
idiosyncratic volatility) in a given year during the sample. Systematic risk is measured as the
difference between the variance of return and idiosyncratic volatility.
The sample is taken from the CRSP-COMPUSTAT Merged universe of stocks for the
Period 2005–2014. The monthly stock and market returns were drawn from a file of stock returns
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). To reduce the impact of infrequent trading
on monthly idiosyncratic volatility and beta estimates, I follow Fu (2009) and require a minimum
of 15 monthly returns during the past 36-monthly returns. I also exclude financial firms (SIC 60006999) and utility firms (SIC 4900-4999). Finally, I exclude observations that have negative values
for volatility measures to arrive at a final sample of 30,234 firm-year observations.
The main independent variable is product market competition which is measured by the
Herfindahl-Hirschman index of concentration (HHI). This index is equal to the sum of the squared
market shares (firm’s sales divided by total industry sales) of all firms in the industry where
industries are defined using four-digit level SIC codes.3 A higher HHI implies a weaker
competition. The HHI is a widely used proxy for product market competition and well-grounded
in industrial organization theory (see Tirole (1988)).
I also control for a set of variables that may affect return volatility as described below:

3

I obtain similar results using the two-digit level SIC code.
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Trading volume, which is measured as the yearly number of shares traded (item # 28)
divided by the total shares outstanding (item# 25). It is included to control for the positive
association between return volatility and volume. Karpoff (1987) cites many studies that document
a positive relation between price volatility and trading volume in a variety of financial markets
including equity market.
Market-to-book, which is measured as market value of assets divided by the book value of
total assets (item # 6). Market value of total assets is measured as total assets minus book equity
plus market value of common stocks. Book equity is defined as total assets (item # 6) minus total
liabilities (item # 181) minus preferred Stock (item # 10) plus deferred taxes (item # 74). If
preferred stock was not available, I use preferred stock at redeemable value (item #175). Market
value of common stocks is defined as common shares outstanding (item # 25) multiplied by closing
price at the end of fiscal year (item # 199). Market to book has two opposing effects on risk. First,
it may reflect the extent of firm’s market power and monopoly rents. Therefore, market-to-book
ratio may relate negatively to systematic and idiosyncratic risk. Second, firms with high market to
book ratio could have many growth opportunities whose value is mainly derived from future
investments. Thus, their value is less predictable than a low-growth firms whose value are derived
mainly from current investments. In this case, high market to book may increase return uncertainty
and, therefore, risk.
Financial and operating leverage. The financial leverage is defined as total liabilities (item
181) divided by total assets (item 6). The operating leverage is measured as net property, plant and
equipment (item 8) divided by total assets. Financial and operating leverage are expected to have
a positive impact on risk. They magnify the influence of economic-wide and firm-specific events
on firms’ returns, leading to higher swings in return when firms are hit by these events. Hamada
(1972) shows that the systematic risk of a firm's common stock should be positively correlated
with the firm's leverage. In particular, he argues that borrowing while maintaining a fixed amount
of equity increases the risk to the investor. Operating leverage is expected to increase the amount
9

of systematic risk. Lev (1974) has shown, by using the approach adopted by Hamada (1972), that
a firm's operating leverage (the ratio of fixed to variable operating costs) affects positively the
systematic risk.
Dividend payout ratio, which is defined as common dividends (item 21) divided by income
before extraordinary items (item 18). Dividend payout ratio may proxy for risk. Hoberg and
Prabhala (2009) report that risk is a significant determinant of the propensity to pay dividends, and
it explains roughly 40% of the phenomenon of disappearing dividends between 1978 and 1999.
Firm’s size, which is measured by the logarithm of total assets. Large firms tend to have
low risk because of their ability to diversify their operation into different business segments, or it
could be that large firms possess a market power which may enable them to reduce cost shocks.
(Moyer& Chatfield, 1983).
Profit margin, which is measured as earnings before interest and taxes divided by sales.
Logue and Merville (1972) hypothesized that firms with a higher operating efficiency tend to
generate higher profits and are thus associated with a lower probability of distress and risk.
Moreover, Gasper and Masa (2006) argue that firms with higher profits are less proportionately
affected by a given size shock. For example, the percentage change for return is lower when the
initial return is high, but the percentage change will be higher when the initial level of return is
low.
1.4 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics for the variables used in this study. The table shows
that firms have an average beta of 1.2, which is slightly higher than the beta estimated by Harvey
(1991), who reported a mean beta of .96 for the U.S. market during the period 1970-1989.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics of sample
This table presents descriptive statistics of main variables. The sample includes all firms in the CRSP-COMPUSTAT
Merged Database over the period of 2005 – 2014. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is equal to the sum of the
squared market shares (firm’s sales divided by total industry sales) of all firms in the industry. Trading volume is
measured as the yearly number of shares traded divided by total shares outstanding. Market-to-book is measured as
market value of assets divided by book value of assets (item 6). The financial leverage is defined as total liabilities
(item 181) divided by total assets (item 6). The operating leverage is measured as net property, plant and equipment
(item 8) divided by total assets. Dividend payout ratio is defined as common dividends (item 21) divided by income
before extraordinary items (item 18). Firm’s size is measured as the logarithm of total assets. Profit margin is measured
as earnings before interest and taxes divided by sales. The idiosyncratic volatility is the sum of monthly squared
residuals with respect to the three factor model of Fama and French. Systematic Volatility is the difference between
total volatility and idiosyncratic volatility. R-square is the percentage of security's movements that can be explained
by movements in a three factors of Fama and French model. CAPM Beta is the average factor loading on value
weighted market return. HML Beta is the average factor loading on HML (the return on a portfolio of high book-tomarket stocks less the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks). SMB beta is the factor loading on SMB
(the return on portfolio of small-size stocks less the return on a portfolio of big-size stocks).

N

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Q1

Median

Q3

CAPM Beta

33,528

1.23003

0.98158

.68477

1.149858

1.6898

HML Beta

20,477

0.09909

1.49902

-.6306

0.108485

.8459

SMB Beta

20,477

0.83898

1.43588

0.008746

.696199

1.52881

Idiosyncratic volatility

33,528

0.02423

0.06372

0.006112

0.012745

.026125

Systematic Volatility

33,528

0.00476

0.00788

0.000869

0.002571

.005954

R-square

33,528

0.20677

0.17031

0.071465

0.182674

.31894

HHI

33,527

0.26817

0.20934

0.12319

0.1960463

0.348243

Financial Leverage

33,411

0.50286

0.54831

0.29603

0.4744461

0.638436

Operating leverage

33,499

0.25625

0.24269

0.067718

0.1663132

0.379079

Trading volume

33,483

2.09021

2.32110

0.066821

1.49698

2.73437

Market to book

33,385

2.00271

2.57114

1.0903

1.4863

2.2196

Dividend payout

33,391

0.25569

6.23585

0.00000

0.00000

0.16771

Profit margin

32,840

-6.19098

229.0339

-.0025098

.0673831

0.141764

Ln (assets)

33,511

6.353329

2.17635

6.31

7.81
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2.91

The average loading on HML factor (the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market
stocks less the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market-value stocks) is .099 while the factor
loading on SMB (the return on portfolio of small-size stocks less the return on a portfolio of bigsize stocks) is .8389. Fama and French (1993) suggest that overall market factor and factors related
to firm size and book-to-market reflects common risk factors. On this ground, I estimate the
systematic volatility as the volatility explained by the three factors of Fama and French model.
Also of note is that the part of the stock’s return volatility that is due to idiosyncratic risk is far
greater than the volatility due to the systematic risk. The mean (median) idiosyncratic volatility is
.0242 (.0127), while the mean (median) of systematic volatility is .00476 (0.00257). Van Horne
(1998) showed that unsystematic risk accounts for approximately 75 percent of the total risk, or
variance, of an average stock in the United States.4 In the sample, the ratio of unsystematic
volatility to total variance is 79.3%, which indicates that most of firms’ return variation is captured
by unsystematic factor or firm-specific events. French and Roll (1986) and Roll (1988) both
conclude that most of the variation in U.S. stock prices reflects the capitalization of firm specific
events. The mean share of systematic volatility, as indicated by R-square, is around 20.67%. The
reported mean of Herfindahl-Hirschman index of concentration (HHI) is .26, which is higher than
the number reported by Gasper and Masa (2006).

In Table 1.2, I divide the sample into two groups based on the median of HHI. The first
group comprises firms operating in highly competitive industries, or those that have HHI lower
than the median. The second group comprises firms operating in lowly competitive firms, or those
that have HHI higher than the median. Descriptive statistics, mean and median differences between
these two groups are provided. Test statistics to assess the difference between the sub-samples are
also provided. I employ a parametric t-test statistic and a nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test
statistic to assess the mean and median differences between these two groups.
4

For the purpose of this dissertation, unsystematic risk, firm-specific risk and idiosyncratic volatility are used
interchangeably.
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Table 1.2: Comparison between highly and lowly competitive industries.
This table presents a comparison between firms in highly competitive industries and firms in lowly competitive industries. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is
equal to the sum of the squared market shares (firm’s sales divided by total industry sales) of all firms in the industry. Trading volume is measured as the yearly
number of shares traded divided by total shares outstanding. Market to book is measured as market value of assets divided by total of assets (item 6). The financial
leverage is defined as total liabilities (item 181) divided by total assets (item 6). The operating leverage is measured as net property, plant and equipment (item 8)
divided by total assets. Dividend payout is defined as common dividends (item 21) divided by income before extraordinary items (item 18). Firm’s size is measured
as the logarithm of total assets. Profit margin is measured as earnings before interest and taxes divided by sales. The idiosyncratic volatility is the sum of monthly
squared residuals with respect to the three factor model of Fama and French. Systematic volatility is the difference between total volatility and idiosyncratic
volatility. R-square is the percentage of security's movements that can be explained by movements in a three factors of Fama and French model. CAPM Beta is the
average factor loading on value weighted market return. HML Beta is the average factor loading on HML (the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks
less the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market- stocks). SMB beta is the factor loading on SMB (the return on portfolio of small-size stocks less the return on
a portfolio of big-size stocks). The significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are represented by *, **, and *** respectively. I employ a parametric t-test statistic and
a nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistic to assess the differences of mean and median.

Firms in competitive industries
Standard
Mean
Median deviation

Firms in lowly competitive industries
Standard
Mean
Median
deviation

N

Mean
difference

Median
difference

Variable

N

Systematic/unsystematic

16,763

0.31934

0.21186

0.36798

16,765

0.37151

0.243571

0.430251

-0.0522***

-0.03171***

CAPM Beta

16,763

1.25313

1.1683

1.01143

16,765

1.20694

1.128464

0.950258

0.0462***

0.03984***

HML Beta

10,514

0.03338

0.0379

1.58903

9,963

0.16841

0.168527

1.394477

-0.1350***

-0.13063***

SMB Beta

10,514

0.867

0.72408

1.5055

9,963

0.809

0.669767

1.35792

-0.0584***

0.05431***

Idiosyncratic volatility

16,763

0.02677

0.014

0.07953

16,765

0.02168

0.011526

0.042209

0.00509***

0.00247***

Systematic Volatility

16,763

0.00478

0.0026

0.00804

16,765

0.00474

0.00254

0.00772

0.00004

0.00005*

R-square

16,763

0.19669

0.17312

0.1641

16,765

0.21685

0.193025

7.234543

-0.0202***

-0.01991***

Herfindahl-Hirschman index

16,762

0.12363

0.12319

0.04249

16,765

0.41267

0.34824

0.209907

-0.2890***

-0.22505***

Financial leverage

16,688

0.50148

0.4606

0.53926

16,723

0.50423

0.485314

0.557204

-0.0027***

-0.024714***

Operating Leverage

16,744

0.28353

0.16913

0.27334

16,755

0.22898

0.164414

0.203999

0.0545***

0.004716***

Trading volume (million)

16,738

2.20858

1.57162

2.33163

16,745

1.97189

1.42846

2.304528

0.2367***

0.14316***

Market to book

16,670

2.18489

1.5724

2.50483

16,715

1.82101

1.41374

2.62311

0.3639***

0.15866***

Dividend payout

16,697

0.2345

0

5.04349

16,694

0.27689

0

7.23454

-0.0424

0

Profit margin

16,215

-11.5713

0.0715

324.123

16,625

-0.9433

0.06519

33.20083

-10.628***

0.00631*

Ln (assets)

16,755

6.34852

6.2522

2.23885

16,756

6.35813

6.35576

2.112059

-0.0096

-0.10356**
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The table presents a preliminary test of the differences in risk measures between
competitive and lowly competitive industries. Firms in competitive industries have an average
(median) idiosyncratic volatility of .0267 (.014), whereas the firms in lowly competitive industries
have an average (median) of .0217 (.012). The mean difference between the two groups is .00509,
and the median difference is .00247. Both the mean and median difference is significant at the one
percent level, indicating that idiosyncratic risk is significantly higher in competitive industries.

While the results indicate that the idiosyncratic volatility is significantly higher in
competitive industries, the systematic volatility is not. Although the CAPM and SMB betas are
significantly higher in competitive industries, the HML beta is significantly lower. This result is
consistent with findings of Bustamante and Donangelo (2014) study in which they find that firms
in more competitive industry generate most of their value through assets in place as opposed to
growth options. Their result is in line with the idea that value destruction due to the threat of entry
or expansion by competitors is procyclical, which will cause firms in competitive industries to
invest less when the market expands or when the productivity level in the economy goes up. Hence,
firms in competitive industries generate the bulk of their value from assets in place, whereas firms
in non-competitive (or concentrated) industries generate the bulk of their value from these yet-tobe-made investments. Accordingly, firms in concentrated industries may have a higher return
sensitivity to HML factor.
I also note that the idiosyncratic volatility compared to the systematic volatility is higher
in competitive industries. Thus, the R-square, which reflects the percent of variance explained by
common risk factors, is significantly lower in the competitive industries.
Before I present the regression results, I first investigate the correlations among our
variables of interest. Pearson correlations coefficients are reported in Table 1.3.
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Table 1.3: Pearson correlation coefficients
This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients among variables used in the OLS regression. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is equal to the sum of the
squared market shares (firm’s sales divided by total industry sales) of all firms in the industry. Trading volume is measured as the yearly number of shares traded
divided by total shares outstanding. Market-to-book is measured as market value of assets divided by book value of assets (item 6). The financial leverage is defined
as total liabilities (item 181) divided by total assets (item 6). The operating leverage is measured as net property, plant and equipment (item 8) divided by total
assets. Dividend payout is defined as common dividends (item 21) divided by income before extraordinary items (item 18). Firm’s size is measured as the logarithm
of total assets. Profit margin is measured as earnings before interest and taxes divided by sales. The idiosyncratic volatility is the sum of monthly squared residuals
with respect to the three factor model of Fama and French. Systematic risk is the difference between total volatility and idiosyncratic volatility. R-square is the
percentage of security's movements that can be explained by movements in the three factors of Fama and French model. CAPM Beta is the average factor loading
on value weighted market return. HML Beta is the average factor loading on HML (the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks less the return on a
portfolio of low book-to-market-value stocks). SMB beta is the factor loading on SMB (the return on portfolio of small-size stocks less the return on a portfolio of
big-size stocks). The significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are represented by *, **, and *** respectively.
(1)
Log of
Idiosyncratic
Variables volatility

(2)
(3)
Log of
Systematic
Volatility
R square

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

CAPM
Beta

Financial
HML Beta SMB Beta leverage

(8)
Operating
Leverage

(9)
Log of
Trading
Volume

(10)

(11)

(12)

Market to Dividend profit
book
Payout
margin

(13)

(14)

Size

HHI

(1)

1

(2)

-0.301***

1

(3)

0.489***

0.666***

1

(4)

0.364***

0.318***

0.588***

(5)

-0.045***

-0.007

-0.045*** 0.058***

1

(6)

0.351***

0.089***

0.358***

-0.35***

0.015*

1

(7)

0.017***

0.012**

0.03***

0.051***

0.039***

-0.023*** 1

(8)

-0.068***

0.055***

-0.003

0.008

0.169***

-0.069*** 0.082***

1

(9)

0.098***

0.130***

0.198***

0.123***

0.135***

0.021***

-0.043***

1

(10)

0.069***

-0.073***

-0.08***
-0.019*** -0.028*** 0.092***

0.042***

0.255***

-0.123***

0.064***

1

(11)

-0.025***

0.017***

-0.003

-0.008

-0.0002

-0.003

0.0007

0.011*

-0.013**

-0.004

(12)

-0.033***

0.025***

-0.003

0.0145**

0.018**

-0.030*** -0.009

0.002

-0.002

-0.042*** 0.001

1

(13)

-0.587***

0.371***

-0.098*** -0.038*** 0.048***

-0.263*** 0.117***

0.242***

0.135***

-0.149*** 0.013**

0.027***

1

(14)

-0.075***

0.022***

-0.031*** -0.029*** 0.051***

-0.0106

0.016***

-0.031***

1

-0.018*** -0.114***
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1

-0.044*** -0.061*** 0.011*

1

Most of the correlation coefficients in this table are statistically significant. Most
importantly, the HHI (which inversely relates to competition intensity) is statistically negatively
related with the idiosyncratic volatility, and CAPM beta. The highest correlation coefficient
reported is between R-square and log of systematic volatility (.66). This is due to the mechanical
relationship between systematic risk factors and R-square where the latter reflects the percent of
return volatility that is explained by the risk-factor model. Generally, we don’t have a serious
multicollinearity problem between the independent variables.

1.5 REGRESSION RESULTS
Table 1.4 presents the association between risk measures and product market competition.
Model (1) uses log of idiosyncratic (or firm-specific) volatility as the dependent variable while
models (2) and (3) use log of systematic volatility and R-square respectively. I log the risk
variables to address the concern that large kurtosis and skewness of variance measures might affect
the distribution of standard errors and hence the statistical inferences (Goyal and Santa-Clara
2003). Firm and year dummies are included in all specifications. Our set of control variables is
similar to the one employed by previous literature and it was described in detail in the “Sample
and Variables” section.
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Table 1.4: Association between risk measures and competition intensity
This table presents the results of the volatility measures and R-square regressions on product market competition
(HHI). In each model of this table, I use a different dependent variable. Model (1) uses the idiosyncratic volatility,
model (2) uses systematic volatility and Model (3) uses R-square as a dependent variable. The Herfindahl-Hirschman
index is equal to the sum of the squared market shares (firm’s sales divided by total industry sales) of all firms in the
industry. Trading volume is measured as the yearly number of shares traded divided by total shares outstanding.
Market to book is measured as market value of assets divided by total of assets (item 6). The operating leverage is
measured as net property, plant and equipment (item 8) divided by total assets. Dividend payout is defined as common
dividends (item 21) divided by income before extraordinary items (item 18). Firm’s size is measured by the logarithm
of total assets. Profit margin is measured as earnings before interest and taxes divided by sales. The idiosyncratic
volatility is the sum of monthly squared residuals with respect to the three factor model of Fama and French.
Systematic volatility is the difference between total volatility and its idiosyncratic volatility. R-square is the percentage
of security's movements that can be explained by movements in the three factors of Fama and French model. CAPM
Beta is the average factor loading on value weighted market return. CAPM Beta is the average factor loading on value
weighted market return. HML Beta is the average factor loading on HML (the return on a portfolio of high book-tomarket stocks less the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market-value stocks). SMB beta is the factor loading on
SMB (the return on portfolio of small-size stocks less the return on a portfolio of big-size stocks). The significance
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are represented by *, **, and *** respectively.

HHI
CAPM Beta
HML Beta
SMB Beta
leverage
Fixed asset Ratio
Trading volume
(million)
Market to book
Dividend payout
Profit margin
Log Size
Firm Dummies
Year Dummies
Number of
observations
Adjusted R square

Dependent variable is Log
of idiosyncratic volatility
(1)
-0.16214***
(0.0609)
0.20167***
(0.00505)
-0.01431***
(0.003226)
0.13995***
(0.00393)
0.12161***
(0.01654)
-0.10141
(0.06228)

Dependent variable is Log of
systematic Volatility
(2)
0.08513
(0.10656)

0.21789***
(0.00696)
-0.0095***
(0.00193)
-0.000081
(0.00060)
-.0000704***
(0.000021)
-0.25064***
(0.00919)
YES
YES

0.20023***
(0.01120)
-0.00737**
(0.00358)
0.00131
(0.000849)
-0.000016
(0.00003)
-0.117428***
(0.01604)
YES
YES

-0.03689***
(0.00166)
0.002145***
(0.00046)
0.0000845
(0.000150)
0.000014**
(0.000006)
0.056137***
(0.002037)
YES
YES

17,552
0.1516

29,485
0.4602

17,552
0.4602

0.05771*
(0.03043)
0.24237**
(0.10305)
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Dependent variable is
R-square
(3)
0.05949***
(0.01485)
0.072008***
(0.001242)
-0.00852***
(0.000797)
0.04227***
(0.00097)
-.004821
(0.00401)
0.015229
(0.015401)

The results concerning the control variables match roughly the findings of previous
literature. Trading volume is positively associated with systematic and idiosyncratic volatility.
Higher trading volume increases the speed at which stock price absorbs the information, thereby
increasing the volatility of stock price, and hence stocks’ return. Indeed, Karpoff (1987) shows
that trading volume is positively related to the magnitude of the price change. Firm’s size is
negatively related to systematic and idiosyncratic volatility while leverage is positively related to
the volatility.
The most important conclusion from table 1.4 is that the impact of competition on
idiosyncratic is positive and statistically significant. The point estimate for HHI is around -0.16
(p-value <.01), implying that higher competition, or lower HHI, increases idiosyncratic risk.
However, the impact of competition on systematic volatility is not significant, implying that
competition mainly increases the firm-specific risk. As a result, the proportion of idiosyncratic
volatility to total volatility should increase, leading to a lower R square. Indeed, the impact of
competition on R square is negative and significant with a point estimate of HHI is .059. The
question that can be raised is why competition did not positively influence the systematic risk. The
answer lies in the components of systematic risk and how they are affected by the changes in the
level of competition. Table 1.5 presents the results of the effect of competition on CAPM beta,
HML beta and SMB beta.
As shown in table 1.5, there is no systematic relation between competition and common
risk factors of the Fama and French model. In particular, competition increases CAPM beta but
also reduces SMB and HML beta, implying that competition in sum may not positively increase
the systematic risk. Although some may view the HML and SMB factors as related to stock returns
anomalies, a number of authors consider them as common risk factors. Berk (1995) argues that
relative firm size measures risk and not a pricing anomaly. His argument is based on the intuition
that if firms have same size and cash flow then risker firms will have lower market values and so
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will have higher expected return. As such, the SMB factor, which mimics a portfolio for the returns
on small minus big stocks, can be regarded as a risk factor. Liew and Vassalou (2000) find that
HML and SMB contain significant information about future GDP growth. In particular, they
documented that the predictive power of HML and SMB is not subsumed when the market factor
or business cycle variables are included in the regression that predicts return.
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Table 1.5: Association between systematic risk factors and competition intensity
This table presents the results of the systematic risk factors regressions on product market competition (HHI). In each model of this table, I use a different dependent
variable. Model (1) uses the CAPM beta, model (2) uses HML Beta and Model (3) uses SMB Beta. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is equal to the sum of the
squared market shares (firm’s sales divided by total industry sales) of all firms in the industry. Trading volume is measured as the yearly number of shares traded
divided by total shares outstanding. Market to book is measured as market value of assets divided by total of assets (item 6). The operating leverage is measured
as net property, plant and equipment (item 8) divided by total assets. Dividend payout is defined as common dividends (item 21) divided by income before
extraordinary items (item 18). Firm’s size is measured as the logarithm of total assets. Profit margin is measured as earnings before interest and taxes divided by
sales. CAPM Beta is the average factor loading on value weighted market return. HML Beta is the average factor loading on HML (the return on a portfolio of
high book-to-market stocks less the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market-value stocks). SMB beta is the factor loading on SMB (the return on portfolio of
small-size stocks less the return on a portfolio of big-size stocks). The significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are represented by *, **, and *** respectively.
Dependent variable = CAPM Beta
HHI
Financial leverage
Operating Leverage

Dependent variable =HML Beta

Dependent variable =SMB Beta

(1)

(2)

-0.022417

0.89685***

0.50141***

(3)

(0.08719)

(0.1689)

(0.15813)

0.117527***

0.17656***

-.05898

(0.02490)

(0.04589)

(0.04296)

0.056779

-0.13398

0.29134*

(0.08432)

(0.17297)

(0.16194)

0.134385***

-0.119655***

0.07615***

(0.009165)

(0.0191)

(0.01789)

-.007782***

-.014565**

-.002924

(0.00293)

(0.00536)

(0.00502)

-0.000126

-0.000169

0.000949

(0.00060)

(0.00168)

(0.00158)

Profit margin

0.0000598**

0.000131**

-.000098*

(0.000024)

(0.00006)

(0.000056)

Log Size

-.097122***

-.196997***

-0.000098

Trading volume (million)
Market to book
Dividend payout

(0.01312)

(0.02548)

(0.02386)

Firm Dummies

YES

YES

YES

Year Dummies

YES

YES

YES

29,485
0.579

17,552
0.525

17,552
0.508

Number of observations
Adjusted R square
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In the context of the capital asset pricing model, the systematic measure of risk is the
CAPM beta only. In such case, competition does not significantly increase the systematic volatility
as the coefficient of HHI in model (1), which uses CAPM beta as a dependent variable, is not
significant. Yet, by considering some of the factors of the Fama and French model, competition
lowers the HML and SMB factors which in turn reduces the systematic risk.

1.6 EVIDENCE FROM TRADE REGULATION
The above section presented results from testing our hypothesis in a cross-sectional
regression framework. In this section, I try to investigate the impact of the softening of trade
barriers on systematic and idiosyncratic volatility. The reduction of import tariff rates has
contributed to the increase of the competitive pressure that many U.S. firms face from their foreign
rivals, Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006). I follow Fresard and Valta (2013) and use the annual
tariff data for the U.S manufacturing sector which are available on Peter Schott's website. The
annual tariff is computed as duties collected at U.S. Custom divided by the Free-On-Board custom
value of imports at the four-digit SIC industry. Then I recognize the industries that faced a tariff
rate reduction.
Figure 1 shows the average tariff rate reduction in each year of the sample which spans
from 1990 to 2005. The figure shows that the highest tariff reduction was in 1990 which coincides
with the adoption of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the U.S. and Canada in 1989.
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Figure 1: Tariff rate reductions
This figure shows the average tariff rate reduction in each year of the sample which spans from 1990 to 2005. The
annual tariff is computed as duties collected at U.S. Custom divided by the Free-On-Board custom value of imports
at the four-digit SIC industry. Tariff (%) is the percentage decline in tariff rate.

Figure 2 shows the number of industries in each year in the sample period. As shown, the
number of industries is not concentrated in any particular time interval. This helps to ensure that
our results are not driven by time-specific effects such as economic downturn or stock market
boom/bust cycles.
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Figure 2: Number of industries during the sample period
This figure shows the number of industries in each year in the sample period. The industries include manufacturing
industries defined using the four-digit SIC code.

The main purpose of this section is to examine how exogenous changes in product market
structure, measured by lower barriers to entry, impact systematic and idiosyncratic volatility (or
risk). As I argue in this paper, the amount of increase in idiosyncratic volatility should be higher
than the systematic volatility. The identification strategy of my test is to compare between
idiosyncratic and systematic volatility before and after the reduction in tariff rate. Then, I compare
between the increase in idiosyncratic volatility and the increase in systematic volatility. To ensure
I have significant reduction in tariff rates, I follow Fresard and Valta (2013) and focus on
industries that experienced a tariff cut that is three times larger than the average tariff reduction in
that industry.
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Table 1.6: Changes in idiosyncratic and systematic volatility
This table reports the mean and median of the average growth rates for the idiosyncratic and systematic volatility. The
sample comprises firms that experienced a significant tariff reduction between 1989 and 2005. I calculate the average
growth rate for each variable during the year preceding the tariff reduction (t-1) and during the year that follows the
tariff reduction (t+1). The idiosyncratic volatility for a particular firm is computed by estimating the mean square
residuals from the three-factor model using monthly returns for the past 36 months. Systematic volatility is measured
as the difference between the total volatility and idiosyncratic volatility. The table also reports p-values for test
statistics of means (standard t-test) and medians (Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
Observations

Mean

t-test
(p-value)

Median

Signrank
(p-value)

1

Idiosyncratic volatility(t-1)

4,930

0.02017247

<.0001

0.009382

<.0001

2

Idiosyncratic volatility(t+1)

4,926

0.02027487

<.0001

0.009431

<.0001

3

Systematic volatility(t-1)

4,773

0.00310094

<.0001

0.00136

<.0001

4

Systematic volatility(t+1)

4,751

0.00304795

<.0001

0.00135

<.0001

5

Diff Idiosyncratic volatility

1,647

0.00223417

<.0001

0.001183

<.0001

6

Diff Systematic volatility

1,575

0.0006922

0.0090

0.000108

.0022

The results in table 1.6 show that the reduction of import tariffs have significant effects on the
idiosyncratic and systematic volatility. As observed, the mean (median) idiosyncratic volatility has
increased by 0.00223 (0.00118) and systematic volatility by 0.0006922 (0.000108). The difference
between the mean (median) increase of idiosyncratic and systematic volatility is .00154 (.001075).
This concur with our main argument and contend that competition increases firm-level volatility
more than the systematic volatility.
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1.7 EVIDENCE FROM PAIR-WISE RETURN CO-MOVEMENTS

The previous analysis has utilized a factor model to identify the common risk factors and
the idiosyncratic volatility. What would happen if the factor model omits an important risk factor?
Obviously, the systematic risk will be understated while the idiosyncratic volatility will be
overstated. In this case, even if competition increases the systematic and idiosyncratic volatility
by the same amount, the increase of idiosyncratic volatility will appear to be greater because it
includes the omitted common risk factor.
One way to circumvent this concern is by defining the idiosyncratic volatility relative to
the systematic volatility without the reliance on a risk-factor model. To achieve this, I use the
average return pair-wise correlation.
Campbell et al. (2001) studied the volatility trend using daily CRSP data ranging from
1962 to 1997 and found that market and industry variances have been fairly stable in that sample
period even though there has been a noticeable increase in firm-level volatility. Accordingly, they
find declines over time in the correlations among individual stocks and in the explanatory power
of the market model for a typical stock. Poti and Kearney (2008) examined the dynamics of
idiosyncratic risk, market risk and return correlations in European equity markets using weekly
observations from 3,515 stocks listed in the 12 euro area stock markets over the period 1974–2004.
They find a rise in idiosyncratic volatility but the correlation among stocks did not decrease as
they find that market risk trended upwarded.
These two studies suggest that the return correlation can be used as proxy to infer the
ratio of idiosyncratic volatility to systematic volatility. More specifically, a high correlation
indicates that stock returns are mainly driven by common risk factors. A low correlation, on the
other hand, indicates that stock returns are mainly affected by the firm-specific risk. As such, if
competition reduces the average pair-wise correlations then we can reach to an evidence that
supports the main argument which states that the effect of competition on idiosyncratic volatility
is larger than its effect on systematic volatility. Thus, I expect that competition, such as that
25

triggered by the reduction in import tariff rates, will increase the proportion of idiosyncratic
variation, leading to a lower return correlation among stocks.

Using the same sample of the above analysis and again by focusing on industry-year that
had negative change in tariff rates that is three times larger than the industry’s average change, I
compare between the pair-wise correlation before and after the reduction in import tariff rates. For
each stock i, I compute the Pearson correlation coefficients between the returns of stock i and all
other stocks by using monthly return data within the past three years. I require firms to have at
least 15 monthly stock returns data. Finally, I compare between the pairwise correlation before
and after the significant reduction of tariff rates. Table 1.7 shows the main results.

Table 1.7: The change in pair-wise correlation before and after the reduction in import tariff rates
This table provides the average and median of pairwise correlation before and after the year that had a significant
reduction in import tariffs. The significant change is defined as a negative change that is three times larger than the
industry’s average negative change. The sample includes manufacturing firms that have a reduction in tariff rate from
1989 to 2005. Return Correlation (t-1) [return correlation (t+1)] is the average return pairwise correlation before [after]
the event time (t) which corresponds to the year that had a significant reduction in tariff rate. Diff Return Correlation
[(t+1)-(t-1)] is the difference between the pair-wise correlation before and after the significant reduction in import
tariff rates. Diff of positive Return Correlation [(t+1)-(t-1)] considers only the pair-wise correlation that is positive
before and after the reduction in tariff rates. The table also reports p-values associated with test statistics for differences
in means (standard t-test) and in medians (Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
t-test
Signrank
(p-value)
(p-value)
N
Mean
Median
Return Correlation (t-1 )
12,028
0.2066 <.0001
0.19667
<.0001
Return Correlation (t+1)
12,028
0.19867 <.0001
0.19625
<.0001
Diff Return Correlation [(t+1)-(t-1)]
12,028
-0.0079 0.0016
-0.0091
0.001
Diff of positive Return Correlation
[(t+1)-(t-1)]
8,054
-0.0077 0.0017
-0.0067
0.0024

On average, the return pairwise correlations has decreased by -.0079 which translates to a
percentage decrease of [.0079/0.2066] *100 = 3.82%. Also, the median return pairwise comovement decreased by .0091 or by [.0091/0.19667] *100= 4.62%. Both, the decrease of mean
and median are significant at one percent level. Moreover, when I consider the pairwise co26

movements that are positive before and after the reduction in tariff rates as shown in last row of
the table, we can notice that there is a reduction in the average and median of pairwise comovements. In sum, the results indicate that an increase in competition level will lead to a higher
increase in idiosyncratic volatility of stocks’ return compared to the systematic volatility. This in
turn will make the return of stocks to be less correlated with each other as the idiosyncratic
volatility comprises a larger portion of their total return volatility.

1.8 CONCLUSION
This essay investigates the impact of product market competition on the behavior of
idiosyncratic and systematic volatility. More specifically, I seek to examine whether the
idiosyncratic volatility moves higher than the systematic volatility when competition intensity
rises. I posit two explanations: Pass through channel explanation and firm’s ranking explanation.
According to the first explanation, market power works as a hedging instrument that smooths out
the idiosyncratic volatility by raising the price to compensate for an increase in firm-specific cost.
However, monopoly power is not relevant for smoothing out systematic volatility as firms in
competitive market can still raise price to compensate for an increase in industry-wide cost.
According to the second explanation, firm’s ranking can be driven primarily by changes in firmspecific costs rather than by the industry-wide costs. This is due to the fact that the former affects
a particular firm while the latter affects all firms in the industry. Competition would magnify the
impact of firm-specific cost shocks on firms’ ranking as will be driven when there are more rivals
in the industry.
I used a panel data to determine the impact of competition on the ratio of idiosyncratic
volatility to systematic volatility over the period of 2005-2014. I use the Herfindahl–Hirschman
index to measure the competition intensity and the Fama–French three-factor model to measure
the idiosyncratic and systematic volatility. After controlling for a host of variables that the existing
literature shows to have an effect on return volatility, I find that competition increases idiosyncratic
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volatility higher than the systematic risk. I also perform two additional analyses to verify the
findings. First, I exploit the changes of industry-level import tariff to identify those industries that
witnessed a falling trade barriers, and thus an increase in competition level, between 1989 and
2005. Consistent with our main results, the increase in idiosyncratic volatility is significantly larger
than the increase in systematic volatility. Second, I use the average pair-wise co-movements as a
different way to measure the change in systematic volatility relative to the change in idiosyncratic
volatility. When I compared between the averages of pair-wise return co-movements before and
after the reduction in tariff rates, I found that the pair-wise correlation goes down, lending more
support to the main hypothesis.
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Chapter 2: essay 2-product market competition, cash flow and corporate
investments

2.1 INTRODUCTION
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the separation of ownership and control will
induce managers to waste firms’ resources including those that are considered to be an important
internal sources of finance. Agency cost of cash flow is considered a major issue in corporate
governance because cash is easily accessible by management with little scrutiny and much of its
use is discretionary, Dittmar and Smith (2007). In this regard, product market competition is being
perceived as corporate governance tool in which it forces a sound investment policy of the cash
flow. 5 Yet, recent evidence suggests that competition may hinder the financing for investments.
For example, Valta (2012) finds that greater product market competition increases the cost of bank
loans of publicly traded US manufacturing firms. Consequently, competition may force managers
to accumulate cash flow to create enough internal liquidity for firms’ operation. As a result, the
investment of cash flow may decline with the increase in competition. Moreover, since financial
constraints increase with competition intensity, I may also predict that the disciplinary role of
competition may be performed fully (or partially) by the presence of the financial constraints and
not by the competition itself. The disciplinary benefit of financial constraints is documented in the
literature, for example Luo (2011) finds that cash spending by managers in financially constrained
firms is associated with higher future profitability and stock returns compared to cash spending by
managers in unconstrained firms.6
In this essay, I study the effect of product market competition on the investment of cash
flow in capital expenditures. Specifically, I explore the role played by competition when firms are
financially constrained. The main purpose of this analysis is to examine whether competition
5 For example, Giroud and Mueller (2011) find that the benefits of good governance are smaller for firms in competitive
industries, suggesting that competition may act as a substitute for good corporate governance.
6 Denis and SibilKov (2010) also find that the marginal investment of constrained firms leads to a larger value increase than that
of unconstrained firms.
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exacerbates the effect of financial constraints and reduces the investment of cash flow in valuable
projects. Also, this essay examines the actual governance role performed by competition by
isolating the effect of financial constraints. To measure the financial constraints, I focus on the
earnings retention ratio and working capital.
My analysis is similar to Broussard, Buchenroth and Pilotte (2004) who estimate the impact
of chief executive officer (CEO) incentives on the sensitivity of investment to cash flow. Following
their study, I identify valuable (non-valuable) investments as concentrated within growth (value)
firms. I choose to focus on investment-cash flow sensitivity to measure the amount of
overinvestment and underinvestment, where positive investment-cash flow sensitivity within value
firm’s subsample is considered overinvesting while negative or no sensitivity within growth firms
is considered underinvesting.7
This essay is based on a panel of 43,113 firms over the period 1985-2014. I initially run
investment regressions as a function of the interaction between competition and cash flow,
separately for growth firms and value firms. I find that competition increases (reduces) the
investment sensitivity to cash flow for growth (value) firms, indicating that competition may
encourage (discourage) the investment of cash flow in valuable (non-valuable) projects. This may
provide an evidence of the role of competition in reducing the agency cost of cash flow by forcing
managers to pursue the best investment policy.8 Yet, when I separate growth firms into a relatively
high and low earnings retention ratio sub-samples, I find that competition increases the investment
sensitivity to cash flow for only the sub-sample of firms with low earnings retention ratio. This
result suggests that competition forces growth firms that are non-financially constrained, as
indicated by their low earnings retention ratio, to invest cash flow in valuable projects. However,
this result will not hold when I examine the growth firms that are financially constrained. In fact,
the sensitivity will turn into negative, suggesting that competition may exacerbate the effect of

7 This essay measures the overinvestment and underinvestment of the cash flow only and not the total overinvestment and

underinvestment.
8 Detailed discussion will be presented later to explain why competition can reduce the agency cost.
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financial constraints and consequently may reduce the investment of cash flow in valuable
projects. When I separate value firms into a relatively high and low earnings retention ratio subsamples, I find that competition reduces the investment sensitivity to cash flow for both subsamples. But the reduction of investment sensitivity is higher for the financially constrained group
(or the high earnings retention ratio group). This indicates that the financial constraints may
perform a significant role in reducing overinvestment.
To validate these findings, I use working capital, which is the difference between current
asset and current liability, as a different way to measure the extent in which firms are financially
constrained. Ding, Guariglia and Knight (2013) find that high working-capital firms exhibit higher
fixed investment rates. Fazzari and Petersen (1993) emphasize the role of working capital as both
a use and a source of funds and show that higher working capital limit the degree of financing
constraints. Accordingly, I classify both the growth and value firms into relatively high-working
capital and low-working capital. I find that competition is associated positively (negatively) with
the investment sensitivity to cash flow within non-financially constrained (financially constrained)
growth firms. These findings support our previous conclusion that competition fosters the
investment of cash flow in valuable projects only when firms are not financially constrained. Also,
I find that competition reduces the cash flow investment in non-valuable projects especially when
firms are financially constrained.
I conduct a battery of tests designed to gauge the robustness of my results. First, I explore
the actual role played by competition in reducing costs and enhancing labor productivity. The
results show that the impact of competition is less important when I control for the effect of
financial constraints. Second, I add a set of various interaction terms that may affect investmentcash flow sensitivity to our main regression model. The results hold robust after the inclusion of
these terms. Third, I use Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index as an alternative measure for financial
constraints and find similar results to our earlier tests. Finally, I apply Euler equation, following
Bond and Meghir (1994), to make sure that cash flow does not proxy for investment opportunities
and the results corroborate with the earlier findings.
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This essay contributes to the existing literature in at least two ways. First, it provides an
evidence on how product market competition may not perform the disciplinary role of investing
the cash flow. I show that firms for which the predominant agency problem is underinvestment
may tend to invest less available cash flow than will the average firm when they are exposed to
financial constraints. Therefore, if competition does not play the role of good governance in
forcing firms to invest the cash flow then the value of these firms can be reduced. Dittmar and
Smith (2007) show that the value of $1 of cash in poorly governed firm is .42 to .88 but good
governance approximately doubles this value. Second, considering that cash is one of the main
determinants of corporate investments, this study demonstrates how competition influences total
investments.9 For example, Lamont (1997) examined the capital expenditures of non-oil
subsidiaries of oil companies and found that the cash shortfall due to the fall of oil price explained
the decline in investments of nonoil units. We may also draw an important policy implication
concerning our findings: If a competitive market structure increases financial constraints then
raising competition (for example, through trade liberalization) may require developing financial
system (for instance, awarding licenses for new banks) in order to alleviate the underinvestment
caused by the financial constraints of competition

9 This paper contributes particularly to the literature that links between investment and competition and generally to the literature

that links between investment and firm growth.

32

2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND TESTABLE HYPOTHESES

There is a vast finance literature that recognizes the role of product market competition on
corporate investment. (See for example Bolton and Scharfstein (1990); Tirole (2006); Akdogu and
MacKay (2008)). More recently, Fr'esard and Valta (2013) examine the competitive pressure from
trade liberalization on corporate investment. They find that U.S. firms significantly reduce capital
and R&D investment and accumulate cash reserves in response to an inflow of foreign rivals
caused by large tariff reductions. Their finding of capital investment reduction can be explained
by two different hypotheses. First, these firms have only reduced the value-destroying projects in
order to be more efficient to compete with new rivals (Let’s call this hypothesis “the role of
a competition agency”). Second, these firms not only reduced the value-destroying projects but
also the value-enhancing projects due to the unavailability of financing caused by higher
competition. (Let’s call this hypothesis “the financial constraints of competition”).

The role of a competition agency can mainly be achieved through three channels, I briefly
mention those papers relevant to each of these channels. First, competition may increase the
probability of bankruptcy by reducing output prices. This idea is formulated in Hart’s Model
(1983) in which he argues that good-managed rival firm may lower price in good economic
condition to capture a larger market share. In this case, firms can not afford to slack even in good
times because industry prices are brought down by rivals. Second, competition may perform the
role of the market for corporate control by increasing the probability of takeover occurrence. This
could be simply due to the increase in the number of bidders who are looking to acquire inefficient
target firms. Fama (1980), and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that strong competition in the
product markets forces inefficient firms out. Third, competition may enable shareholders and
board of directors to filter out exogenous market shocks from firm performance and thus they may
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be able to determine the performance of CEO. As such, shareholders can perform a stronger
internal corporate governance. 10

The financial constraint of competition is caused mainly by the increase in financial risk.
Gasper and Masa (2006) find a positive association between competition and firm’s return
idiosyncratic volatility. They argue that firms in lowly competitive industries can use their market
power to smooth out volatility, i.e. they can influence market price to maintain the same level of
performance. Valta (2012) finds a higher cost of borrowing for firms operating in more competitive
industries. In his sample, one standard deviation increase in product market competition raises
financing costs by about 13 basis points for an average loan. This increase in the cost of external
financing may, therefore, drive firms with growth opportunities to invest less than the first-best
optimum, leading to a lower future growth and firm value, Denis and Sibilkov (2010).11
Consequently, product market competition may motivate managers to secure internal funds to
finance firms’ operation. Mikkelson and Partch (2003) argue that a policy of high cash holdings
may be an operating necessity. As a result, the financial constraint of competition hypothesis
predicts that the competition exacerbates the effects of financial constraint and consequently, may
reduce the cash flow investment in valuable projects. On the other hand, financial constraints may
perform the disciplinary role in reducing the unnecessary investments. Thus, the financial
constraints may mitigate the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders over
deployment of cash flow. Luo (2011) argues that a manager at a constrained firm should have less
incentive to invest cash in value-decreasing projects as compared to an unconstrained manager
because if cash is invested today on inefficient projects, constrained managers may have to pass
by positive net present value projects in the future when cash flow is low. Almeida, Hsu and Li

10 Gibbons and Murphy (1990) examine a large sample of CEO successions from 1974 to 1986 and find that both market and
industry shocks are filtered out. Moral Hazard of hiding input information (manages effort) can not be resolved completely but
may be lessened when shareholders can compare the performance of the firms they own to a relative benchmark. For detailed
discussion about moral hazard, see Holmström (1979, 1982).
11 Specifically, they find that constrained firms with low cash have significantly lower Altman’s z-scores, interest coverage
ratios, cash flow margins, and changes in cash flow margins than high cash constrained firms.
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(2013) show that financial constraints may benefit innovation by improving the efficiency of
innovative activities of research and development.
The analysis and explanation of the results are based on the role of competition agency
hypothesis and also on the financial constraint of competition hypothesis. The role of
a competition agency hypothesis predicts that competition will perform a disciplinary role and
reduce overinvestment. Also, the hypothesis predicts that competition will reduce the
underinvestment to avoid the loss of investment opportunities and market share to rivals.12 On the
other hand, the financial constraint of competition hypothesis predicts that competition may
increase underinvestment. Therefore, firms with valuable growth opportunities may decide to
hoard cash flow to build up cash reserves. Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998); Harford (1999); and
Opler et al. (1999) report that firms with greater difficulties in obtaining external capital
accumulate more cash. Moreover, the hypothesis predicts that competition may reduce
overinvestment to deal with the increase in financing costs. By reducing overinvestment, firms
may increase cash holdings which can be used to finance unexpected operating losses and to avoid
bankruptcy (Morellec and Nikolova (2009)).

2.3 SAMPLE SELECTION

The sample includes public companies in the United States with financial data available
in COMPUSTAT over the period of 1985–2014. In order to eliminate the possible effects of
regulation, I exclude companies in the financial (SIC 6000–6999) and utility (SIC 4900–4949)
industries. I also exclude firm years with non-positive values for total book assets, cash holdings,
sales and capital expenditures. I also eliminate firms that did not have complete records on our
main regression variables. Finally, I drop all firms with less than 2 years of consecutive
observations. These sample selection criteria result in 431,13 firm-year observations. The sample
12 The term used for this kind of risk in the literature is called “predation risk”.
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is unbalanced, with the number of observations ranging from a minimum of 1,195 in 2003 to a
maximum of 1,716 in 1986.

Table 2.1 presents the number of observations in each industry and the size of each industry
in the sample. The industry classification is based on the two-digit SIC codes.13

Table 2.1: Sample concentration in industries.
Descriptive statistics showing the number of observations in major industries. “% of observations” is the
percentage of observations in each of the major industries relative to total number of observations in the sample. The
final sample includes 431,13 firm-year observations.

Industry category
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Services
Non-classifiable Establishments
Total

Number of observations
281
3,470
330
23,921
4,509
2,215
3,665
4,516
206
43,113

% of observations
0.65
8.05
0.77
55.48
10.46
5.14
8.51
10.47
0.48

As shown by the table, most of the firm-year observations are found in Manufacturing
(23,921), Service (4,516) and Transportation (4,509) sectors. Manufacturing industry contains
approximately 55 percent of the total number of firm-year observations. This is because companies
that consistently have capital expenditure on their balance sheet are naturally those with
manufacturing business. The high representation of manufacturing firms in the sample may make
my study comparable to other studies which limit their sample to manufacturing firms only.14

13

I obtain similar results using the four-digit SIC code.

14 Example of these studies are Ghosal and Loungani (1996) and Lamont (1997).
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2.4 MODEL SPECIFICATION AND VARIABLES

To measure the effect of competition on overinvestment and underinvestment of free cash
flow, I document many models of investments as a function of interaction between cash flow and
competition. The main model is shown below:

(I/K) i,t = a0+ a1(S/ K)i,t-1 + a2 Q i,t -1+a3 (C/K) i,t-1 +a4 (CF/ K) i,t-1 + a5 Ln(MV i,t-1)+a6 HHI i,t-1.(CF/
K)i,t-1 + a7 LV i,t-1 + a8 HHI i,t-1 + a9 RR i,t-1 + a10 (WK/K) i,t-1 + τ t+ λi +εi,t

(2.1)

For firm i and year t, I is investment (capital expenditure, (item 30)). K is the beginning of
period capital stock (net property, plant and equipment, (item 8) ), S is sales (item 12) , and Q is
the beginning of period estimate of Tobin's Q. It is defined as market value of assets divided by
book value of assets (item 6). Market value of total assets is measured as total assets minus book
equity plus market value of common stocks. Book equity is defined as total asset (item 6) minus
total liabilities (item 181) minus preferred stock (item 10) plus deferred taxes (item 74). If preferred
stock was not available, I use preferred stock at redeemable value (item 175). Market value of
common stocks is defined as common shares outstanding (item 25) multiplied by closing price at
fiscal year (item 199). C is cash plus marketable securities (item 193), CF is cash flow net of
common and preferred dividends. It is calculated as income before extraordinary items (item 18)
plus depreciation and amortization (item 14) minus preferred dividends (item 19) minus common
dividends (item 21). LV is leverage measured as total liabilities (item 181) divided by total assets
(item 6). HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of concentration measured as the sum of the
squared market shares (sales over total industry sales) of firms in the industry.15 I define industries
2
15 The formula for the Herfindahl-Hirschman index is 𝐻𝐻𝐼 = ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑆𝑖

Where Si is the market share of firm i in the industry, and N is the number of firms. It can range from 0 to 1.0, moving from a huge
number of very small firms to a single monopolistic producer. An increase in the Herfindahl index generally indicates a decrease
in competition and an increase in market power.
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using the two-digit level SIC codes.16 RR is earnings retention ratio which is defined as income
before extraordinary items (item 118) divided by the amount of ordinary dividends (item 21). WK
is working capital measured as the firms’ net current assets minus current liabilities. The parameter
τt is a year fixed effect, λi is a firm fixed effect, and εi,t is the error term. The firm and year
fixed effects capture differences in capital spending across years and firms that are not captured
by the independent variables. All independent and control variables are lagged by one year to
mitigate the possibility of simultaneity or reverse causality bias, Steinberg and Malhotra (2014).
Table 2.2 shows the variable definitions and how each variable is calculated.

Table 2.2: Variables definition
This table shows the definition of the variables used in this essay. The Investment model is: (I/K)i,t = a0+ a1(S/ K)i,t-1
+ a2 Q i,t -1+a3 (C/K) i,t-1 +a4 (CF/ K) i,t-1 + a5 Ln(MVi,t-1)+a6 HHI i,t-1.(CF/ K)i,t-1 + a7 LV i,t-1 + a8 HHI i,t-1 + a9 RR i,t-1 +
a10 (WK/K) i,t-1 + τ t+ λi +εi,t . The parameter τ t is a year fixed effect, λi is a firm fixed effect, and εi,t is the error term.

Variable

Definition and measurement

Investment (I)

Capital expenditures, (item 30)

Fixed capital (K)

Net property, plant and equipment, (item 8)

Sales (S)

Sales (item 12)

Tobin's Q (Q)

Market value of assets divided by book value of assets.
Market value of total assets is measured as total assets
minus book equity plus market value of common stocks.
Book equity is defined as total asset (item 6) minus total
liabilities (item 181) minus preferred Stock (item 10) plus
deferred taxes (item 74). If preferred stock was not
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available, I use preferred stock at redeemable value (item
175).
Cash (C)

Cash plus marketable securities (item 193)

cash flow (CF)

CF is cash flow net of common and preferred dividends.
It is calculated as income before extraordinary Items
(Item

18)

plus

depreciation

and

amortization

(Item 14) minus preferred dividends (Item 19) minus
common dividends (Item 21).
LV (leverage)

LV is leverage measured as total liabilities (item 181)
divided by total assets (item 6).

HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman index of

The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is equal to the sum

concentration)

of the squared market shares (sales over total industry
sales) of firms in the industry.

RR (Earnings retention ratio)

RR is earnings retention ratio which is defined as Income
before Extraordinary Items (item 118) divided by the
amount of ordinary dividends (item 21).

WK (working capital)

WK is measured as the firms’ net current assets minus
current liabilities

The literature has presented a variety of ways to measure the level of financial constraints.
However, there is no general consensus on which measure is the best proxy for financial
constraints. As a result, I perform our analysis using two approaches for sorting firms into
financially constrained and non-financially constrained. First approach is to use the annual payout
ratio suggested by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) who argue that non-constrained firms
are more likely to have higher payout ratios, whereas constrained firms are more likely to have
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lower payout ratios. Throughout the text, I will refer to this variable as earnings retention ratio
because its calculation reflects the amount of earnings relative to dividends. Therefore, higher
amount of this ratio reflects the amount of earnings that are not paid as dividends. Accordingly, I
assign those firms below (above) the median of earnings retention ratio distribution to the nonfinancially constrained (financially constrained) group. Earnings retention ratio is defined as
income before extraordinary Items (item 118) divided by the amount of ordinary dividends (item
21).
I use working capital as another measurement of financial constraints. Working capital is
measured as the firms’ net current assets (such as cash and short term credit) minus current
liabilities (such as accounts payable and any short term debt). Firms with high working capital
should be more able to meet their financial needs and be in a good position for raising external
finance than do firms with low working capital. Fazzari and Petersen (1993) demonstrate the role
of working capital in smoothing investments. Thus, working capital can be viewed as a source of
financing. Ding, Guariglia and Knight (2013) explore the role played by working capital
management in explaining why Chinese firms were able to invest at very high rates despite
significant financing constraints. Accordingly, I classify firms that have working capital above
(below) the median value as non-financially constrained (financially constrained).

Table 2.3 refers to general firm characteristics in full sample, concentrated industries and
competitive industries. Concentrated industries (competitive industries) refer to the industries with
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) above the median (below the median). Table 2.4 describes the
firm’s characteristics of four groups of firms classified based on earnings retention ratio and HHI.
The first and second group are financially constrained and non-financially constrained
firms in competitive industries respectively, while the third and fourth group contain the
financially constrained and non-financially constrained firms in concentrated (or non-competitive)
industries respectively.
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Column 1 in table 2.3 presents descriptive statistics for the whole sample. The mean HHI
for the full sample is .075 which indicates that the average firm’s sales relative to its total industry
sales is equal 7.5 percent. Given that HHI is bounded between zero and one, we can perceive that
the average firm operates in a competitive industry. The mean Tobin’s Q is 1.675, which is higher
than one, indicating that the average firm in the sample has valuable investments opportunities.
The means indicate that capital expenditures averaged 21.37 percent of beginning capital and cash
flow averaged 36.68 percent of capital. The mean (median) holdings of cash and marketable
securities relative to total capital are 68.24 (19.51) percent. The cash and marketable securities
may play an important role in increasing financial slack by providing enough liquidity for firms’
operation and investment. In columns 2 and 3 in table 2.3, I present descriptive statistics for firms
in competitive and concentrated industries respectively. The table shows that firms in competitive
industries are quite different from the firms in concentrated industries. For instance, the mean of
cash to fixed capital (working capital) for competitive industries is 86.82 percent (140.79 percent).
By contrast, the cash to fixed capital (working capital) is 50.81 percent (99.61 percent) for
concentrated industries.
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Table 2.3: Differences between concentrated and competitive industries
This table presents a summary of the sample used in the empirical analysis. The table shows a summary of the full sample, concentrated industries and competitive
industries. Concentrated industries (competitive industries) refers to the industries that have Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) above (below) the median.
Herflndahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is equal to the sum of the squared market shares of all firms in the industry. Market Value is defined as common shares
outstanding (item 25) multiplied by closing price at fiscal year (item 199). The numbers denote mean values; parentheses, medians. The definitions of the other
variables are shown in table 2.2. Test statistics to assess the difference between the sub-samples are also provided. I employ a parametric t test statistic and a
nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistic. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistic tests the null hypothesis that the median difference between subsamples
is equal to zero. To control for extreme observations or data recording errors, I winsorize the observations at 99% and 1%. *, **, and *** next to the coefficient
estimates indicate a 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Full sample
Competitive industries
Concentrated industries
Diff of mean (2-3)
Diff of median (2-3)
Variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
HHI
0.07507
0.03766
0.117648
-0.07998***
-0.04877***
(0.056269)
(0.03833)
(0.08710)
Fixed investment/Fixed capital (I/K)
0.21368
0.21353
0.213152
0.00038
0.003587
(0.188037)
(0.18193)
(0.17834)
Market Value
6766.76
7806.59
5728.37
2078.22***
292.113***
(711.584)
(1509.689)
(1217.576)
Leverage
0.51025
0.508701
0.512388
-0.00369
0.006166
(0.523444)
(0.52677)
(0.520611)
ROA variance
0.00231
0.002364
0.002242
0.00012*
-0.000018*
(0.000922)
(0.00081)
(0.00083)
Cash/fixed capital (C/K)
0.68242
0.86815
0.508104
0.36005***
0.07763***
(0.19507)
(0.253102)
(0.175472)
Tobin’s Q
1.67509
1.76925
1.58327
0.18598***
0.12653***
(1.3468)
(1.50226)
(1.375739)
Sale/capital (S/K)
6.20224
6.187391
6.16817
0.019224
0.45386***
(4.1609)
(4.35443)
(3.9006)
Retention ratio
3.61259
3.49806
3.75054
-0.252476***
-0.22187***
(2.6268)
(2.67957)
(2.90145)
Working capital
1.20716
1.407902
0.99612
0.411787***
0.26431***
(0.57138)
(0.71097)
(0.4467)
Observations
22,315
11,691
10,541
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The mean earnings retention ratio for firms in competitive industries is 3.45 percent which
is lower than the figure for the firms in concentrated industries (3.75 percent). This supports the
disciplinary force of competition which induces managers to payout excess cash as dividends. By
using industry concentration ratios from the Census of Manufacturers, Grullon and Michaely
(2007) find that firms in more competitive industries have significantly higher payout ratios than
firms in less competitive markets.

In table 2.4, I study the differences between financially constrained and non-financially
constrained groups of firms that belong to the same competition group. Generally, financing
constraints exert changes on corporate policies of firms. In particular, they reduce the amount of
debt and increase cash and working capital. However, these changes are higher for firms in
competitive industries than in concentrated industries. The decline in leverage for firms in
competitive (concentrated) industries is 5.12 percent (3.27 percent). The increase in working
capital for firms in competitive (concentrated) industries is .198 (.144). The higher changes for
competitive industries when they are exposed to financing constraints are in line with the model
of Morellec, Nikolov and Zucchi (2008). Their model suggests that the value of cash holding
increases with the intensity of product market competition. They argue that cash balance is
important to reduce financing constraint that is caused by competition risk. In conclusion,
financing constraints may force firms to invest more toward working capital rather than capital
investments.
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Table 2.4: The effect of financial constraints on competitive and concentrated industries
This table shows statistics of the financially-constrained and non-financially constrained firms in concentrated and competitive industries. I define constrained
(non-constrained) firms as those whose retention ratio is above (below) the median. Retention ratio is income before extraordinary items divided by common
dividend paid. Concentrated industries (competitive industries) refers to the industries that have Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) above the median (below the
median). Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is equal to the sum of the squared market shares of all firms in the industry. Market Value is defined as common
shares outstanding (item 25) multiplied by closing price at fiscal year (item 199). The numbers denote mean values; parentheses, medians. The definitions of the
other variables are shown in table 2.2. Test statistics (parametric t test) to assess the difference between the mean of sub-samples are also provided. To control for
extreme observations or data recording errors, I winsorize the observations at 99% and 1%. *, **, and *** next to the coefficient estimates indicate a 10%, 5%,
and 1%, respectively.

Variable
HHI
Investment/Fixed capital
Market Value
Cash flow/Fixed capital
Leverage
ROA variance
Cash/Fixed capital
Tobin’s Q
Sale/ Fixed capital
Earnings retention ratio
Working capital
Observations

Financially
Constrained/
Competitive Industries
(1)
0.0385989
(0.038773)
0.2318
(0.196657)
6790.57
(1414.516)
0.5930906
(0.434887)
0.4851636
(0.500286)
0.0020852
(0.000711)
0.8588017
(0.295737)
1.8286178
(1.576162)
6.7299856
(5.007315)
6.4082383
(4.641122)
1.4776949
(0.886128)
5,786

Non-FinanciallyConstrained
/Competitive
Industries
(2)
0.0367708
(0.037883)
0.1952932
(0.168052)
8954.109
(1609.688)
0.2469156
(0.200893)
0.5363913
(0.557585)
0.0025826
(0.000910)
0.8378939
(0.21387)
1.69797
(1.42918)
5.646115
(3.728883)
0.587531
(1.444406)
1.27921
(0.52184)
5,787

Financiallyconstrained/Concentrated
industries
(3)
0.1165931
(0.086696)
0.2420904
(0.205789)
6195.218
(1449.893)
0.4551199
(0.339958)
0.495931
(0.500393)
0.001860
(0.000668)
0.522175
(0.193365)
1.691507
(1.47382)
6.934312
(4.47175)
7.35852
(5.36359)
1.059295
(0.51065)
5,226
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Non-Financiallyconstrained
firms/concentrated
(4)
0.11899
(0.0885)
0.18386
(0.1523)
5326.39
(1008.98)
0.168176
(0.13687)
0.528688
(0.54457)
0.002576
(0.00101)
0.47499
(0.158057)
1.46786001
(1.280594)
5.4347
(3.4397)
0.18427521
(1.256562)
0.91545177
(0.38023)
5,226

Diff (1-2)
(5)
0.001828***

Diff (3-4)
(6)
-0.0024

0.036507

0.05823***

-2163.54***

868.8278***

0.346175***

0.286944***

-0.05123

-0.03276***

-0.0005*

-0.00072***

0.020908***

0.047185***

0.130648***

0.223647***

1.083871***

1.499612***

5.820707***

7.174241***

0.198485***

0.143843***

Table 2.5 presents the correlations between the key variables of interest. I note that sales
are significantly and positively correlated with both cash flows and cash. This is simply due to the
cash received from selling the product or service. Moreover, investment is positively correlated
with Tobin’s Q because the latter reflects higher investment opportunities that the firm may
undertake. There is a negative correlation between investment and leverage indicating that debt
overhang may reduce the incentives of managers to invest. Aivazian, Ge and Qiu (2005) show that
leverage is negatively related to investment and that this negative effect is significantly stronger
for firms with low growth opportunities than those with high growth opportunities.
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Table 2.5: Correlation matrix
This table presents the correlation matrix between the key variables used in the empirical analysis. I is investment (capital expenditures, (item 30)). K is the
beginning of period capital stock (net property, plant and equipment) (item 8), S is sales (item 12) , and Q is the beginning of period estimate of Tobin's Q. It is
defined as market value of assets divided by book value of assets (item 6). Ln (MV) is logarithm of market value where it is defined as common shares outstanding
(item 25) multiplied by closing price at fiscal year (item 199). C is cash plus marketable securities (item 193), CF is cash flow net of common and preferred
dividends. LV is leverage measured as total liabilities (item 181) divided by total assets (item 6). HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index which is equal to the sum
of the squared market shares (sales divided by total industry sales) of firms in the industry. RR is earnings retention ratio which is defined as Income before
Extraordinary Items (Item 118) divided by the amount of ordinary dividends (Item 21). WK is working capital measured as the firms’ net current assets minus
current liabilities. *, **, and *** next to the coefficient estimates indicate a 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
S/K

Tobin’s Q

Variable

I/K

C/K

CF/ K

I/K

1

S/K

0.0983***

1

Tobin’s Q

0.0969***

0.0164***

1

C/K

0.0681***

0.7381***

0.0209***

1

CF/ K

0.0459***

0.888***

0.0020

0.6709***

1

LN(MV)

-0.046***

-0.0275***

0.1276***

-0.0128***

0.0017

1

HHI*CF/ K

0.0444***

0.7963***

0.0012

0.4306***

0.7996***

-0.0015

1

LV

-0.066***

0.0208***

-0.0300***

0.0227***

0.0096**

0.18566***

0.00037

1

HHI

0.00212

0.0003

-0.0179***

-0.0065

-0.0033

-0.0956***

0.00531

0.00714

1

RR

-0.00100

0.0003

-0.0020

-0.0005

0.0030

0.00751

0.00222

-0.017***

0.0066

1

WK

0.0833***

0.6104***

0.0057

0.3644***

0.4728***

-0.0186***

0.69651***

-0.0109**

0.0014

-0.00001
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LN(MV)

HHI* CF/ K

LV

HHI

RR

2.5 REGRESSIONS OF INVESTMENT ON CASH FLOW AND COMPETITION

To conduct tests about the effect of competition on the investment of cash flow, I employ
the regression model presented in section 2.4. In a first step of the analysis, I estimate the empirical
model on the full sample. In a second step, I re-estimate the empirical model on two subsamples
comprising either growth firms or value firms. This allows us to assess the effects of competition
on firm’s investment for cash flow in valuable projects and in value-destroying projects. In
particular, I split sample firms into two groups based on their Tobin’s Q ratio. Firms with Tobin’s
Q ratio greater than one are classified as growth firms and thus considered to be more likely to
have valuable investment opportunities, while firms with Tobin’s Q lower than one are classified
as value firms and thus are more likely considered to have non-valuable investment opportunities.
Therefore, underinvestment problem should be more concentrated in growth firms, whereas
overinvestment problem should be more concentrated in value firms. Using Tobin’s Q to classify
firms that are prone to overinvest or underinvest is based on the theory that Tobin’s Q should be
the only determinant of investment.17 Also, this method was adopted by Broussard, Buchenroth
and Pilotte (2004) who estimated the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) incentives on the
sensitivity of investment to cash flow.
Table 2.6 shows the regression of our model. The main independent variable is the
interaction between competition and cash flow (HHI*CF/K) which measures the influence of
competition on the investment of cash flow. In other words, this interaction term refers to how the
response of investment to cash flow may change when the level of competition changes.

17 The theory is based on the assumption that there is no capital market imperfection or no liquidity constraints on firms.
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Table 2.6: Regressions of investment on cash flow and competition
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the regression results for full, growth and value sample separately.
The dependent variable is capital expenditures in year t scaled by fixed capital (K) [(I/K)], and the independent
variables are measured in year t-1. Ln (MV) is logarithm of market value where it is defined as common shares
outstanding (item 25) multiplied by closing price at fiscal year (item 199). For variable definition and description
please refer to table 2. *, **, and *** next to the coefficient estimates indicate a 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively,
significance level. Standard errors of the coefficients estimates are in parentheses.
Dependent variable: Investment [(I/K)]
Variable

HHI i,t-1*CF/K i,t-1

Q i,t -1

(CF/ K)i,t-1

Full sample

Growth sample

Value sample

-0.26962***

-0.284463***

0.037085 ***

(0.01958)

(0.024474)

(0.01254)

0.003432

0.003596

0.777721 ***

(0.00334)

(0.00383)

(0.19393)

0.022426***

0.003423 **

(0.00146)

(0.001345)

0.00315***

0.003051***

-.0005168 **

(0.00082)

(0.001077)

(0.00024)

0.031457***

0.009287***

(0.00137)

(0.00046)

-0.46957***

-.1628771 ***

(0.07821)

(0.10871)

(0.02897)

-0.001136

-0.004621

-.8730996 ***

(0.015688)

(0.01792)

(0.19071)

1.411541

2.50106

-.287946

(2.26925)

(3.16328)

(0.53772)

151,821

119,242

325,79

.0030359***
(0.000173)

(S/ K)i,t-1

(C/K) i,t-1

0.028194***
(0.00108)

Ln(MV i,t-1)

LV i,t-1

HHI i,t-1

No. of obs.

-0.305763**

Year Indicators

YES

YES

YES

Firm level Indicators

YES

YES

YES
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2.6 RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION

For the full sample, the coefficient of HHI* CF/K is −.269. The negative sign indicates that
the sensitivity of investment to cash flow increases when competition level increases (or when
HHI decreases). Since the majority of firms in the sample are growth firms (the mean Tobin‘s Q
for the full sample is greater than one), then the results indicate that the dominant influence of
competition on the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is through the reduction in the tendency
of the sample firms to underinvest cash flow. The control variables in full sample regression
(column 1) indicate that capital spending (I/K) is positively related to sales (S/K) and Tobin’s Q.
Thus, investment appears to increase with product demand and the profitability of investment.
However, capital spending is negatively related with leverage. In column (2) I run the regression
model using only the growth firms’ sample. The interaction term coefficient (HHI* CF/K= -.284)
is negative and larger than obtained from the full sample regression. Nonetheless, the coefficient
turns to be positive when I run the regression model using only the value firms’ sample, indicating
that competition reduces the investment response to cash flow for firms with no valuable
investment opportunities. As a result, competition reduces firms’ tendency to invest the cash flow
in value-destroying projects. By comparing the leverage coefficient between the growth and value
samples, we can notice that the coefficient is significantly negative only for value firms’ sample.
This supports the conclusion of Lang, Ofek and Stulz (1996) that the leverage reduces the
investment for firms with low Tobin’s Q ratio.
The previous analyses did not recognize the effect of financial constraints on the relation
between competition and the response of investment to cash flow.18 In order to identify the effect
of financial constraints, I divide the growth and value firms into non-financially and financially
18 In fact, our previous conclusion may not hold because I did not control for the level of financial constraints. For example, the
positive effect of competition on the sensitivity of investment to cash flow for growth firms could be due to higher financial
constraints associated with higher competition and not to its disciplinary role.
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constrained sub-samples. Financially constrained firms are those with earnings retention ratio that
is above the median value while the non-financially constrained firms are those with earnings
retention ratio below the median. Table 2.7 reports the results for the sample split based on Tobin’s
Q and earnings retention ratio.
Columns 1 and 2 refer to growth firms that are financially and non-financially constrained,
respectively. Columns 3 and 4 refer to value firms that are financially and non-financially
constrained, respectively. The results show the impact of product market competition on
investment (capital expenditure) when firms are financially or non-financially constrained.
Financial constraints can either complement or substitute the role of competition in reducing the
investments in non-valuable projects. If the substitute (complementary) effect dominates, then we
should expect insignificant (significant) effect of competition in reducing capital expenditures
among value firms that are non-financially constrained.
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Table 2.7: Regressions of investment on cash flows and competition
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the regression results for growth and financially constrained firms (column 1), growth and non-financially
constrained firms (column 2), value and financially-constrained firms (column 3), value and non-financially-constrained firms (column 4). Financially constrained
firms are those with earning retention ratio that is above the median while the non-financially constrained firms are those with earning retention ration below the
median. The dependent variable is Capital Expenditures (or investment) in year t scaled by fixed capital (K) and the independent variables are measured in year t1. For variable definition and description please refer to table 2. *, **, and *** next to the coefficient estimates indicate a 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively,
significance level. Standard errors of the coefficients are in parentheses.

Dependent variable: Investment scaled by fixed capital (K) [(I/K) ]
Variable

Growth and Financially

Growth and non-Financially

Value and Financially

constrained subsample

constrained subsample

constrained subsample

Value and non-financial
Constrained

subsample

HHIi,t-1.CF/K i,t-1

Q i,t -1

(CF/ K)i,t-1

(S/ K)i,t-1

(C/K) i,t-1

0.283783 ***

-.0666342 ***

0.179286***

0.007164**

(0.050624)

(0.00553)

(0.06957)

(0.00369)

0.0142532***

.0082009 **

-.0018735

0.207936***

(0.001608)

(0.003429)

(0.06396)

(0.03492)

0.023778***

-.00360119 ***

0.102561***

-.00472***

(0.00546)

(0.000326)

(0.00986)

(0.00087)

.0028658***

.0036014 ***

-.0035598***

-.0000073

(0.00023)

(0.000254)

(0.00071)

(0.00008)

0.003347***

-.0020832***

(0.00112)

(0.000331)
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0.03581***

-.002174***

(0.00219)

(0.00033)

Ln(MV i,t-1)

LV i,t-1

HHI i,t-1

RR i,t-1

No. of obs.

-.0071756

0.000609

-.026568**

-.0067336

(0.00549)

(0.01215)

(0.01258)

(0.00579)

-.109823***

-.1393379 ***

-.159941***

-.32922***

(0.02752)

(0.047501)

(0.06209)

(0.03699)

-.100549

-.31146828*

0.023526

-.1281895

(0.08081)

(0.172825)

(0.133829)

(0.08575)

0.000004

0.000021

-.0000459

-.0000022

(0.000016)

(0.000028)

(0.000076)

(0.000013)

17,983

17,950

Year Indicators

YES

Firm level Indicators

YES

YES
YES
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4,555

4,094

YES

YES

YES

YES

The interaction term (HHI*CF/K) among value firms that are financially constrained is 0.179 (pvalue<.01) while the coefficient for non-financially constrained is 0.0071 (p-value=0.05). There is
a remarkable difference in the amount and significance level between the amounts of these two
coefficients. To test whether there is a statistical significant difference between the two
coefficients, I use the following test statistic proposed by Clogg, Petkova and Haritou (1995):

𝑍=

𝑏𝑖 −𝑏𝑗

(2.2)

2
2
√𝜎𝑏𝑖 −𝜎𝑏𝑗

Where bi and bj are the regression coefficients for ith and jth equations, and 𝜎𝑏2𝑖 and 𝜎𝑏2𝑗 are the
variance of the standard error of bi and bj, respectively. Z follows a standard normal distribution.
The Z statistic is 2.47 which indicates a significant difference between the two coefficients at the
one percent level. This suggests that the competition reduces the sensitivity of capital expenditures
to cash flow for value firms more when these firms are financially constrained. Thus, financial
constraints help alleviate the overinvesting agency problem and hence improves investment
efficiency. The results also support the role of competition agency in reducing non-valuable
investments since the coefficient is positive for the value firms that are not financially constrained.
Although financial constraints complement the role of product market competition in
reducing the overinvesting, they hinder the role of competition in investing the cash flow in
valuable opportunities. As seen in table 2.7, the coefficient of the interaction term (HHI*C/K) is
(0.283) and it is positive and significant for growth firms that are financially constrained which
indicates that higher competition reduces the investment of cash flow in valuable investments.
Thus, the results support the financial constraints of competition hypothesis. However, the
coefficient of the term for growth firms that are not financially constrained is significantly negative
(-.066), indicating that higher competition (or lower HHI) increases the sensitivity of investment
to cash flow. Therefore, the results indicate that competition may alleviate the suboptimal
investments caused by agency problems only if firms are not financially constrained. The previous
analysis has utilized earnings retention ratio as a measure of financial constraints, I also apply the
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amount of working capital as a different measure to classify firms into financially and nonfinancially constrained firms. As shown in table 2.8, competition increases the sensitivity for those
firms that are not financially constrained (growth firms with working capital above the median).
However, competition reduces the sensitivity of investment to cash flow for growth firms that are
financially constrained (growth firms with working capital below the median value), where the
amount of interaction term is 0.0692. This is consistent with the earlier results that competition
may exacerbate the effect of financial constraints and consequently may reduce the investment of
cash flow in valuable opportunities. The results also show that financial constraints complement
the effect of product market competition and reduce the cash flow investment in value-destroying
projects. The coefficient of the interaction term for value firms that are not financially constrained
is 0.0322 and it is significant at one percent level. The amount of the coefficient increases to 0.4803
when I examine the effect of competition for value firms that are financially constrained. The Zstatistic of the difference between these two coefficients is 28.25. Thus, financial constraints play
a disciplinary role by reducing the investment of cash flow in non-valuable projects.

.
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Table 2.8: Regressions of investment on cash flows and competition
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the regression results for growth and financially-constrained firms (column 1), growth and non-financially-constrained firms (column
2), value and financially-constrained firms (column 3), value and non-financially-constrained firms (column 4). Financially constrained firms are those with working capital ratio
that is below the median while the non-financially constrained firms are those with earning retention ration above the median. The dependent variable is Capital Expenditures (or
investment) in year t scaled by fixed capital (K) and the independent variables are measured in year t-1. For variable definition and description please refer to table 2. *, **, and ***
next to the coefficient estimates indicate a 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, significance level. Standard errors of the coefficients are in parentheses
Dependent variable: Investment scaled by fixed capital (K) [(I/K) i,t]
Variable

Growth and Financially
constrained subsample

HHIi,t-1*CF/K i,t-1

Q i,t -1

(CF/ K)i,t-1

(S/ K)i,t-1

(C/K) i,t-1

Ln(MV i,t-1)

LV i,t-1

Growth and non-Financially

Value and Financially

Value and non-Financial

constrained subsample

constrained subsample

Constrained subsample

0.069249*

-1.82376***

0.4803232***

0.032249***

(0.04123)

(0.072877)

(0.017502)

(0.00741)

0.003508

0.038671

(0.00456)

(0.024281)

-0.001085

0.149713***

(0.00238)

(0.00254)

0.026785***

-0.02585***

(0.002332)

(0.00139)

0.5237066***
(0.055956)
0.008445***
(0.00191)
-.004221***
(0.000714)

- 0.123657***

-0.150478***

(0.014959)

(0.00366)

- .816502***

0.06902

(0.18784)

(0.14776)

- .090747***

2.2428004***

(0.021892)

(0.5354304)
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-.0217008***

1.068149***
(0.13319)
-0.002222**
(0.00088)
0.001015***
(0.00016)
0.00229***

(0.00295)

(0.00044)

-.0453574***

-0.199147***

(0.00786)

(0.02347)

-.79195195***

-1.156553***

(0.05998)

(0.13899)

HHI i,t-1

6.988409

2.1065104

-.3913715*

-.09732

(6.06874)

(3.622812)

(0.20057)

(0.34173)

-0.023859***

.274066***

-.2776992***

(0.001503)

(0.00401)

(0.001098)

(0.000325)

No. of obs.

58,389

58,524

14,263

17,160

Year indicators

YES

YES

YES

YES

firm Indicators

YES

YES

YES

YES

WK i,t-1
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-0.000799**

Overall, the results support the free cash flow theory proposed by Jensen (1986) which
predicts that competition in the product market tends to drive prices towards minimum average
cost and therefore must motivate managers to increase efficiency to enhance the probability of
survival. Moreover, the disciplinary role of competition is strengthened with the increase of
financial constraints. Yet, the disciplinary role of competition in fostering investments in valueenhancing projects may be hindered by the effect of financial constraints.

2.7 COMPETITION, LABOR PRODUCTIVITY AND COST EFFICIENCY
In this section, I explore the actual role played by competition in reducing costs and
enhancing labor productivity. As I have argued earlier, competition may increase financing
constraints which in turn may reduce firm’s tendency to invest cash flow in non-valuable
investments. This may raise doubt about the substantive importance of role performed by
competition itself in reducing inefficiency. Giroud and Mueller (2011) show that weak corporate
governance does not significantly reduce labor productivity or increase input costs in a highly
competitive industries. They conclude that competition is a substitute of good corporate
governance and thus the presence of weak corporate governance in competitive industries does not
worsen firms cost efficiency or productivity. However, their study does not consider the effect of
financial constraints, which is more pronounced in competitive markets. I seek to isolate and
analyze the effect of competition on labor productivity and input costs. To achieve this, I define
four dummy variables which are; 1. Financially constrained firms in highly competitive industries
(High competition/Constrained), 2. Financially constrained firms in lowly competitive industries
(Low competition/Constrained), 3. Non-financially constrained firms in highly competitive
industries (High competition/Non-Constrained), 4. Non-financially constrained firms in lowly
competitive industries (Low competition/Non-Constrained)
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Table 2.9: The effect of interaction between competition and financial constraints on overhead costs and labor productivity
This table presents the estimates from regressing overhead costs and labor productivity on competition and financial constraints dummy variables. I define four dummy variables
which are; 1. Financially constrained firms in highly competitive industries (High competition/Constrained), 2. Financially constrained firms in lowly competitive industries (Low
competition/Constrained), 3. Non-financially constrained firms in highly competitive industries (High competition/Non-Constrained), 4. Non-financially constrained firms in lowly
competitive industries (Low competition/Non-Constrained). Firms with earning retention ratio that is above (below) the median are considered to be financially constrained (nonfinancially constrained). Firms are considered to operate in highly competitive industries (lowly competitive industries) if the HHI is below (above) of its median. I use two dependent
variables, first is overhead costs which is measured as selling, general, and administrative expenses (item 189), divided by total assets (item 6). Second is labor productivity which
is measured as the logarithm of sales (item 12) divided by the number of employees (item 29). The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is equal to the sum of the squared market
shares (sales over total industry sales) of firms in the industry. Retention ratio is defined as Income before Extraordinary Items (Item 118) divided by the amount of ordinary dividends
(Item 21).
Overhead costs
Variable
Low
competition/Constrained

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

-.00781***

0.0429***

(0.0011)

(0.0043)

Low competition/NonConstrained

[6]

0.00972***

-0.04416***

(0.0011)

(0.0044)

High
competition/Constrained

[7]

-.00651***

0.02234***

(0.0012)

(0.00444)

High competition/NonConstrained
Retention ratio

Labor productivity
[8]

0.00539***

-0.0255***

(0.00121)

(0.00467)

-.000003*

-.000003*

-.000003*

-.000003*

0.000005

0.000005

0.000006

0.000006

(0.000002)

(0.000002)

(0.000002)

(0.000002)

(0.000006)

(0.000006)

(0.000006)

(0.000006)

0.05769***

0.039***

0.04262***

0.0553***

-0.1693***

-0.0766**

-0.09839**

-0.14869***

(0.01067)

(0.0107)

(0.0107)

(0.0106)

(0.0415)

(0.04159)

(0.0417)

(0.0415)

Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Number of observations

43,123

43,123

43,123

43,123

45,614

45,614

45,614

45,614

Adjusted R Squared

0.900

0.900

0.900

0.900

0.880

0.880

0.880

0.880

HHI
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Firms above (below) the median of earning retention ratio are considered to be financially
constrained (non-financially constrained). Firms are considered to operate in highly competitive
industries (lowly competitive industries) if the HHI is below (above) of its median. In Table 2.9, I
use two dependent variables, first is overhead costs which is measured as selling, general, and
administrative expenses (item 189), divided by total assets (item 6). Second is labor productivity
which is measured as the logarithm of sales (item 12) divided by the number of employees (item
29).
As noticed, competition level is negatively associated with overhead cost and positively
correlated with labor productivity. Yet, when I consider the effect of financial constraints along
with competition (as indicated by High competition/Constrained dummy variable), the impact of
competition in reducing overhead costs will increase. The coefficient of that dummy variable is (.0065). Firms in competitive industries that are not financially constrained have lower impact on
overhead costs than indicated by the reported coefficient of HHI. The coefficient of High
competition/Non-Constrained dummy variable is 0.005 which is positive and statistically
significant at one percent level.
By referring to columns 5 to 8, we can notice that competition increases labor productivity
but that impact will be lower for firms that are not financially constrained. The reported coefficient
of the dummy variable (High competition/Constrained) is .022 while the coefficient of (High
competition/Non-Constrained) is -.025. Thus, if we do not isolate the effect of financial constraints
from the effect of competition, then our estimate of the competition in increasing labor productivity
will be overestimated. Overall, the results support our prior main conclusion in which the effect of
competition in reducing inefficacy or enhancing productivity can be driven partially by the effect
of financial constraints.
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2.8 INTERACTION TERMS
In this section, I add a set of various interaction terms to our main regression model. The
reason is that competition might be correlated with variables which can affect the investment-cash
flow sensitivity. For example, HHI is correlated with Tobin’s Q and firm’s size and if these
variables affect the sensitivity of investment to cash flow, then omitting their interaction with cash
flow from regression will induce a bias on the effect of competition on investment cash flow
sensitivity. I include three interaction terms which are: (1) Size-cash flow, (2) Tobin’s Q-cash flow
and (3) Asset tangibility-cash flow interaction terms.
Smaller firms are expected to face higher borrowing costs when raising capital due to
difficulty in accessing external sources of capital. Thus, size may reduce the sensitivity of
investment to cash flow. Fama and French (1992) find that size do a good job explaining the crosssection of average returns on NYSE, indicating that large firms can issue securities at a lower cost.
In addition, these firms are perceived by creditors as less risky since large firms enjoy an economic
of scale and stability. As such, large size may lower the responsiveness to invest cash flow as large
firms can access external market for financing at lower cost compared to small size firms which
rely more in the availability of internal funds, such as cash flow, to finance investments.
Alternatively, some studies associate large size with a more disperse ownership structure, leading
to higher likelihood of agency problems of overinvestment (Vogt, 1994 and Riddick, 1998).
Hence, size could be positively associated with investment cash flow sensitivity as entrenched
managers have the tendency to invest cash flow in value destroying projects.
Tobin’s Q may influence the investment cash flow sensitivity. Firms with high Tobin’s Q
are expected to show higher investment sensitivity to cash flow because they have potential
investment opportunities.
Asset tangibility, which is estimated by dividing the book value of a firm's net fixed capital
(item 8) by total assets, is expected to reduce borrowing costs due to the higher collateral value of
assets. Firms with lower asset tangibility are also more likely to operate in industries with lower
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growth opportunities (Hovakimian, 2009). Consequently, higher asset tangibility could relate
negatively to investment cash flow sensitivity due to lower financing constraints and growth
opportunities.
Table 2.10 presents the results of adding these interaction terms to the regression model.
In model (1), I present the original model and then I add one additional interaction term in each
regression (model 2 to model 4). Model 5 contains all interaction terms.
As shown, the results remain robust to the addition of these interaction terms. For example,
the coefficient of the variable (HHI i,t-1*CF/K i,t-1) is positive when I run the regression using the
sub-sample of growth firms that are financially constrained while the coefficient is negative for
the subsample of growth firms that are not financially constrained. Also, the coefficient is positive
for value firms for both subsamples (financially and non-financially constrained groups). Yet, the
coefficient is positively higher for the financially-constrained subsample, thereby supporting the
role of financial constraints in reducing overinvestments. All of these results are the same found
in earlier tests. These results will hold even after including all the interaction terms.

.
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Table 2.10: Regressions of investment on cash flow, competition and a host of interaction terms
This table reports the coefficient estimates from regressing investments on a host of explanatory variables. AT is the fixed ratio calculated as net property, plant and equipment
divided by total assets. For other variable definition and description please refer to table 2.2. Panel A reports the coefficient estimates from using a sample that contains only growth
firms that are financially constrained. Panel B reports the coefficient estimates from using a sample that contains only growth firms that are not financially constrained. Panel C
reports the coefficient estimates from using a sample that contains only value firms that are not financially constrained. Panel D reports the coefficient estimates from using a sample
that contains value firms that are financially constrained. Growth firms are defined as those firms with Tobin’s Q greater than one while value firms are defined as those with Tobin’s
Q lower than one. Financially constrained firms are those with earning retention ratio that is above the median while the non-financially constrained firms are those with earning
retention ration below the median. The dependent variable is Capital Expenditures (or investment) in year t scaled by fixed capital (K) at time t-1 and the independent variables are
measured in year t-1. *, **, and *** next to the coefficient estimates indicate a 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, significance level. Standard errors of the coefficients are in parentheses
Panel A. Regression using only growth firms that are financially constrained
Variable
Model (1)
HHI i,t-1*CF/K i,t-1
0.283782***
(0.05062)
MV i,t-1*CF/K i,t-1

Model (2)
0.16662***
(0.0507)
-.021242***
(0.0013)

Model (3)
0.154281***
(0.051)
-.021191***
(0.00135)
0.084268**
(0.03834)

0.01448***
(0.0015)
0.186429***
(0.01168)
0.002226***
(0.00023)
-.004431***
(0.00121)
0.007411
(0.00552)
-.101875***
(0.0272)
-0.06896
(0.08016)
0.000002
(0.00001)

0.010391***
(0.00245)
0.186955***
(0.01168)
0.00222***
(0.00023)
-.004426***
(0.00121)
0.005437
(0.0056)
-.103739***
(0.0273)
-.21826**
(0.10506)
0.000003
(0.00001)

Q i,t-1*CF/K i,t-1
AT i,t-1*CF/K i,t-1
Q i,t -1
CF i,t -1
(S/ K)i,t-1
(C/K) i,t-1
Ln(MV i,t-1)
LV i,t-1
HHI i,t-1
RR i,t-1

0.01425***
(0.0016)
0.02377***
(0.00546)
0.00286***
(0.00023)
0.003347***
(0.00112)
-0.007175
(0.00549)
-.109822***
(0.02752)
-0.10054
(0.0808)
0.000004
(0.00001)
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Model (4)
0.15052***
(0.0511)
-.021105***
(0.00135)
0.08284**
(0.0383)
0.04749
(0.04336)
0.01017***
(0.00245)
0.18603***
(0.01171)
0.002250***
(0.00023)
-.004374***
(0.00121)
0.005192
(0.0056)
-.101206***
(0.0274)
-.216185**
(0.10508)
0.000002
(0.000015)

No. of obs.
Year Indicators
Firm level Indicators
Adjusted R Squared

17983
Yes
Yes
0.26575866

17983
Yes
Yes
0.277856113

17983
Yes
Yes
0.277856113

17983
Yes
Yes
0.277856113

Panel B. Regression using only growth firms that are not financially constrained
Variable

Model (1)

Model (2)

Model (3)

Model (4)

HHI i,t-1*CF/K i,t-1

-.066634***

-.165314***

-.165319***

-.160712***

(0.00553)

(0.0142)

(0.0142)

(0.01416)

-.0046945***

-.00469***

-.004687***

(0.00062)

(0.00062)

(0.00062)

0.02737

0.02903

(0.0628)

(0.0625)

MV i,t-1*CF/K i,t-1
Q i,t -1*CF/K i,t-1
AT i,t-1*CF/K i,t-1

-.363434***
(0.03676)

Q i,t -1

0.0082**

0.008194**

0.006125

0.00502

(0.00342)

(0.00342)

(0.0058)

(0.00583)

CF i,t -1

-.0036012***

0.030129***

0.03013***

0.03023***

(0.00032)

(0.0044)

(0.0044)

(0.00446)

(S/ K)i,t-1

0.0036014***

0.00408***

0.004081***

0.00407***

(0.00025)

(0.00026)

(0.00026)

(0.00026)

-.0020832***

-.002634***

-.002633***

-.00277***

(0.00033)

(0.00033)

(0.00033)

(0.00033)

0.000608

0.00055

0.000523

0.009865

(0.01214)

(0.01212)

(0.0121)

(0.01211)

LV i,t-1

-.13934***

-.143351***

-.144416***

-.1974031***

(0.0475)

(0.0474)

(0.04747)

(0.0476)

HHI i,t-1

-.31147*

-.296672*

-.342512*

-.337407*

(C/K) i,t-1
Ln(MV i,t-1)
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(0.17282)

(0.17248)

(0.202)

(0.20133)

0.000021

0.0000202

0.00002

0.000024

(0.00002)

(0.000026)

(0.000027)

(0.000026)

No. of obs.

17950

17950

17950

17950

RR i,t-1

Year Indicators

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm level Indicators

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Adjusted R Squared

0.923615767

0.924910415

0.924910415

0.924910415

Panel C. Regression using only value firms that are not financially constrained
Variable

Model (1)

Model (2)

Model (3)

Model (4)

HHI i,t-1*CF/K i,t-1

0.00716*

0.00968**

0.00968**

0.01061**

(0.0036)

(0.00418)

(0.00418)

(0.00418)

MV i,t-1*CF/K i,t-1

0.00066

0.00066

0.000486

(0.00051)

(0.00051)

(0.00052)

0.08598

0.05901

(0.3319)

(0.33121)

Q i,t -1*CF/K i,t-1
AT i,t-1*CF/K i,t-1

0.06869
(0.019612)

Q i,t -1
CF i,t -1
(S/ K)i,t-1
(C/K) i,t-1
Ln(MV i,t-1)
LV i,t-1

0.20793***

0.20826***

0.200017***

0.209656***

(0.03492)

(0.0349)

(0.04727)

(0.04723)

-.004719***

-.006928***

-.006927***

-.006833***

(0.00086)

(0.00193)

(0.00193)

(0.001933)

-0.000007

-0.000082

-0.000082

-0.000088

(0.000083)

(0.0001)

(0.00010)

(0.00010)

-.002173***

-.001927***

-.001927***

-.001957***

(0.00032)

(0.00038)

(0.000381)

(0.00038)

-0.006733

-0.00704

-0.007044

-0.009016

(0.00579)

(0.00579)

(0.00579)

(0.00581)

-.329222***

-0.327403

-.327160***

-.324520***
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HHI i,t-1
RR i,t-1

(0.03699)

(0.03702)

(0.03704)

(0.03695)

-0.12818

-0.129816

-0.202574

-0.179648

(0.0857)

(0.08574)

(0.29373)

(0.29303)

-0.0000022

-0.000002

-0.000002

-0.000002

(0.00001)

(0.000013)

(0.000013)

(0.000013)

No. of obs.

4094

4094

4094

4094

Year Indicators

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm level Indicators

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Adjusted R Squared

0.9

0.88

0.89

0.91

Panel D. Regression using the sample that contains only value firms that are financially constrained
Variable

Model (1)

Model (2)

Model (3)

Model (4)

HHI i,t-1*CF/K i,t-1

0.179285***
(0.06957)

0.36057***
(0.08371)
0.02409***
(0.00622)

0.32548***
(0.08437)
0.023324***
(0.00621)
-1.665421***
(0.54353)

0.33184***
(0.08437)
0.02700***
(0.00644)
-1.76550***
(0.54514)
0.29619**
(0.13694)

-0.001873
(0.06396)
0.102561***
(0.00986)
-.003559***
(0.00071)
0.035809***
(0.00218)
-.026567**
(0.01258)
-.1599401**
(0.06209)

0.01713
(0.06399)
-0.045462
(0.03947)
-.003699***
(0.00071)
0.03695***
(0.0022)
-.03594***
(0.01278)
-.17080***
(0.062)

0.1633**
(0.07974)
-0.04047
(0.03945)
-0.00349***
(0.00071)
0.03678***
(0.0022)
-0.036301***
(0.01276)
-0.17746***
(0.06194)

0.15875**
(0.07972)
-0.07078*
(0.04184)
-0.00300***
(0.00074)
0.03673***
(0.00219)
-0.03640***
(0.01275)
-0.14687**
(0.0635)

0.02352
(0.1338)

-0.01701
(0.133907)

1.4459***
(0.49581)

1.54109***
(0.49743)

MV i,t-1*CF/K i,t-1
Q i,t -1*CF/K i,t-1
AT i,t-1*CF/K i,t-1
Q i,t -1
CF i,t -1
(S/ K)i,t-1
(C/K) i,t-1
Ln(MV i,t-1)
LV i,t-1
HHI i,t-1
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RR i,t-1
No. of obs.
Year Indicators
Firm level Indicators
R square
Adjusted R Squared

-0.000045
(0.00007)
4555
Yes
Yes
0.676
0.435540933

-0.000045
(0.000075)
4555
Yes
Yes
0.678
0.439025249
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-0.00004
(0.000075)
4555
Yes
Yes
0.679
0.440767406

-0.000043
(0.000075)
4555
Yes
Yes
0.6801
0.44268378

2.9 ALTERNATIVE MEASURE FOR FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS
I use Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index (alternatively known as KZ index) as an alternative
measure for financial constraints. Following Lamont, Polk, and Saa Requejo (2001), I construct
an index of the likelihood that a firm faces financial constraints by applying the following
linearization to the data
KZ=−1.001909*CashFlow/K+0.2826389*Tobin’sQ+3.139193*Debt/TotalCapital−39.3678*Div
idends/K−1.314759*Cash/K
Where:
Cash Flow/K = (income before extraordinary items + depreciation and amortization)/ property,
plant, and equipment lagged.
Tobin’s Q = (total liabilities and stockholders’ equity + Market Equity – Book Value of total
common equity - deferred taxes)/ total liabilities and stockholders’ equity.
Debt/Total Capital = (long-term debt + debt in current liabilities)/ (long-term debt + debt in current
liabilities + stockholders’ equity).
Dividends/K= (common dividends + preferred dividends)/ property, plant, and equipment lagged
Cash/K= cash and short-term investments/ property, plant, and equipment lagged.
Companies with a higher KZ-Index scores are more likely to experience difficulties
financing their ongoing operations. Firms with KZ index above (below) its median value are
considered financially constrained (unconstrained). I allow firms to change their status over the
sample period by ranking firms on an annual basis.
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Table 2.11: Regressions of investment on cash flows and competition by using KZ index as a
measure of financial constraints
This table reports the coefficient estimates from regressing investment on a host of explanatory variables. For variable
definition and description please refer to table 2.2. Growth/Non-Constrained group contains only growth and nonfinancially-constrained firms. Growth/Constrained group contains only growth and financially-constrained firms.
Value/Non-Constrained group contains only value and non-financially-constrained firms. Value/Constrained group
contains only value and financially-constrained firms. Financially constrained firms are those with Kaplan and
Zingales index (KZ index) that is above the median while the non-financially constrained firms are those with KZ
index below the median. The dependent variable is Capital Expenditures (or investment) in year t scaled by fixed
capital (K) in year t-1 and the independent variables are measured in year t-1. *, **, and *** next to the coefficient
estimates indicate a 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, significance level. Standard errors of the coefficients are in
parentheses.
Variable
HHI i,t-1*CF/K i,t-1
Q i,t -1
CF i,t -1
(S/ K)i,t-1
(C/K) i,t-1
Ln(MV i,t-1)
LV i,t-1
HHI i,t-1
KZ i,t-1
No. of obs.
Year Indicators
Firm level Indicators
Adjusted R square

Growth/Non-Constrained
-0.70928***
(0.03752)
0.07834**
(0.03553)
0.094301***
(0.00206)
-0.03147***
(0.00131)
0.07424***
(0.00152)
-0.06467
(0.167031)
-0.18886
(0.12098)
4.88498
(4.33840)
0.001040***
(0.000120)
58,050
Yes
Yes
0.1954

Growth/Constrained
0.229142***
(0.05009)
0.002106
(0.00529)
-0.02297***
(0.00285)
0.047299***
(0.00313)
0.00529
(0.012412)
-0.83769***
(0.18738)
-0.01755
(0.02287)
5.93976
(5.78808)
-0.00003
(0.00015)
57,935
Yes
Yes
0.1612

Value/ non-Constrained
0.02844
(0.02239)
1.14202***
(0.39083)
-0.00133
(0.00236)
0.00029
(0.000363)
0.00302***
(0.00071)
-0.25160***
(0.07648)
-0.60030
(0.46442)
-0.86588
(1.209720)
-0.00013
(0.00022)
15,566
Yes
Yes
0.357

Value/Constrained
0.127006***
(0.01646)
0.508468
(0.07221)
-.006664
(0.001656)
0.005986
(0.00017)
0.000874
(0.000814)
-.058864
(0.008811)
-.689709
(0.07308)
-.240008
(0.172012)
0.00104
(0.00069)
15,759
Yes
Yes
0.465

The table reports similar results that I got earlier. Competition encourages cash flow
investment only when firms are not financially constrained. Also, the results show that financial
constraints play an important role in reducing overinvestment. The coefficient of the term (HHI i,t1*CF/K i,t-1)

is statistically positive in the subsample that contains value firms that are financially

constrained while it is insignificant in the subsample that contains value firms that are nonfinancially constrained.
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2.10 ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION

One possible criticism of this study is that the mismeasurement of Tobin’s Q could be
reflected in cash flow. More specifically, if cash flow provides information about future investment
opportunities not captured by Tobin’s Q then the investment sensitivity to cash flow will reflect
the availability of investment opportunities and not the cash flow ability to undertake investments.
This will change the interpretation of cash flow coefficient. But that coefficient is not our main
variable in the study (the main variable is the interaction term between competition and cash flow,
HHI

i,t-1*CF/K i,t-1).

However, this kind of mismeasurement may affect the interpretation of the

interaction term if competition affects the investment-timing patterns. Indeed, firms in competitive
industries prefer to invest sooner than firms in monopolistic industries to avoid the loss of
investments to rivals (Akdoğu and MacKay, 2008). According to real option theory, it may be
optimal for firms in monopolistic industries to wait before investing in irreversible capital
expenditures in order to postpone costly capacity adjustments or irreversible investment in the face
of uncertainty (McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Pindyck (1988)). Therefore, the interpretation of
our results that competition encourages the cash flow investment may not be warranted because
the higher investment sensitivity of cash flow in competitive industries could be due to the lower
value of waiting and not due to better agency control.
To alleviate that concern, I apply Euler equation approach developed by Bond and Meghir
(1994), who modeled investment spending without requiring a measurement of Tobin’s Q. Their
empirical approach involves regressing investments on lagged investment and its square, sales,
cash flow, debt squared, firm and year level indicators. The coefficient of cash flow in this case
does not proxy for firm’s investment opportunities but rather reflects the effect of cash flow in
smoothing investments. If competition increases the sensitivity of cash flow in this model, then
our prior conclusion about the positive impact of competition in encouraging profitable
investments will hold.
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Table 2.12: Euler equation empirical approach
This table reports the coefficient estimates from regressing investments on lagged investment and its square, sales, cash flow, debt
squared, firm and year level indicators. For variable definition and description please refer to table 2.2. The table is an implication
of Euler equation empirical approach developed by Bond and Meghir (1994).
Variable
Growth/Non-Constrained
Growth/Constrained
HHI i,t-1*CF/K i,t-1
-0.20987***
0.167988***
(0.03009)
(0.051824)
(S/ K)i,t-1
0.013229 ***
0.0030324***
(0.001215)
(0.000237)
CF i,t -1
0.021229***
0.034609***
(0.00204)
(0.005177)
HHI i,t-1
5.41686
-0.02248
(4.4239)
(0.085183)
LV i,t-1* LV i,t-1
0.00000311
-.05021114**
(0.000027)
(0.020121)
I/K i,t-1
-0.03962 ***
-0.0109467
(0.01386)
(0.00836)
I/K i,t-1* I/K i,t-1
-0.0000076***
0.0000291
(0.000003)
(0.00004)
No. of obs.
93,571
17,064
Year Indicators
Yes
Yes
Firm level Indicators
Yes
Yes
Adjusted R Squared
0.1216
0.381

When I implement this approach for growth firm’s sample, I get qualitatively identical
results to those from our basic specification. Competition increases the sensitivity of investment
to cash flow only when firms are not financially constrained. Since the findings are similar to those
found earlier, the main results are not driven by mismeasurement of Tobin’s Q.
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2.11 CONCLUSION

Scholars have long argued that competitive pressure from product markets plays an
important role in inducing managers to carry out the best investment policy that maximizes the
shareholders’ wealth. However, recent evidence shows that competition increases financial
constraints which in turn may prevent firms from using cash flow for undertaking valuable
investments. This essay finds results that support that claim where competition is found to
exacerbate the effect of financial constraints and consequently impedes cash flow investment in
valuable projects. Moreover, this essay finds that financial constraints, which increases with
competition, play a major role in alleviating managerial overinvestment behavior. Although it
finds that the financial constraints of competition do not eliminate the role of product market
competition in reducing overinvestment problems, it might be claimed that the previous studies’
findings have overstated the disciplinary benefit of product market competition in alleviating
managerial suboptimal investment.
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Chapter 3: essay 3- product market competition and the exposure of assets’
return to movements in aggregate consumption

3.1 INTRODUCTION
According to the canonical finance theory, the cost of equity is determined by the assets’
exposure to systematic risk. There are two types of systematic risks that were documented in the
asset pricing literature. First, the risk caused by assets’ return co-movement with market return as
implied by the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) (see Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965)).
Second, the risk caused by the assets’ return co-movement with consumption fluctuation as defined
by consumption oriented capital asset pricing model (C-CAPM) (see Rubinstein (1976) and
Breeden (1979)).
Identifying variables that influence the systematic risk may determine the economic
sources that justify differences in risk premium. One of these variables is the product market
competition. Many studies document a negative relation between monopoly power, which is
inversely related to market competition, and systematic risk using the CAPM model. Subramanian
and Thomadakis (1980), provide theoretical reasoning which shows how firms’ monopoly power
may reduce their exposure to movements in market return, or alternatively CAPM beta.19
19

They define the source of risk as the uncertainty of cash flow, which is determined by the uncertainty of output
and input prices as shown in the following equation.
Fj= PjQj (1+ ê) - WjLj(1+û) where Fj refers to a firm’s cash flow or the amount of profit, Pj is the price of output,
Qj is quantity of output sold and ê represents uncertainty of future price. Wj is the wage rate, Lj is the amount of labor
used to produce outputs and û represents the uncertainty of wage payment. The Equation states that firm’s cash flow
equals to sales revenue minus cost of labor. The uncertainty source of cash flow (Fj), and thus risk, is derived from
the uncertainty of output prices (ê) and input prices (û). To estimate beta, we need to obtain the covariance between
firm’s j cash flow and the aggregate cash flow of all firms in the market, as shown in the equation below:
COV (Fj, Fm) = PjQjSs2ê + WjLjDs2û
Fm is the aggregate cash flow of all firms in the market, S is the aggregate sales and D is aggregate amount of wages.
s2ê is variance of ê and s2û is variance of û. Since the price of output and wage labor are not determined ex-ante, firms
do not know in advance the amount they have to pay for labor wage or receive from sales. Thus wages and output
prices are the sources of uncertainty for firms’ return, and hence risk. Beta is defined as follows:
Bj= COV (Fj, Fm) /VAR (Fm),
Beta (Bj) is a function of covariance between firm’s cash flow and market cash flow (aggregate cash flow), which is
mainly determined by uncertainty of input and output prices. As known, low competition allows firms to change price
without inducing significant impact on output. Therefore, firms in lowly competitive industries may exert control over
price and wage rate and consequently may reduce the uncertainty regarding the output and input prices.
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However, there is no study that examines the effect of competition on C-CAPM beta. This
contribution is important because C-CAPM beta explains the cross sectional differences of risk
premium that may not be explained by the CAPM beta. Consequently, the C-CAPM beta explains
variations in mean return differently than the CAPM beta. Bansal, Dittmar and Lundblad (2005)
show that the cross-sectional dispersion in the measured C-CAPM beta explains approximately 62
percent of the cross-sectional variation in observed risk premium. Parker and Julliard (2005) show
that the long-horizon of consumption fluctuation explains 44 to 73 percent of the variation of
expected return across portfolios. Their study documents a strong explanatory power of C-CAPM
that rivals the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993).
By using data on monthly consumption, obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
and return, obtained from CRSP, of all firms listed on CRSP-COMPUSTAT tape from 2002 to
2013, I directly measure C-CAPM beta. I find that competition, as measured by HerfindahlHirschman index of concentration (HHI), explains approximately sixty one percent of the
dispersion in the measured C-CAPM beta. Further, the estimated effect of the HHI on the beta is
sizable, statistically significant and positive in all various HHI specifications.
The findings of a negative association between competition and C-CAPM beta may be
based on how firms with different monopoly power react to fluctuation in aggregate consumption.
In particular, if firms with monopoly power accommodate to the change in consumption demand
by adjusting price, as opposed to output, than do firms with low or no monopoly power, then the
profit volatility of the former is going to be higher than the latter. For example, raising the price to
accommodate the increase in consumption, enables firms to obtain profits without having the need
to raise production expenditures, which in turn would lead to a higher increase in profits than
obtained from raising the output. By the same token, reducing the price in order to accommodate
the decrease in consumption will lower the firms’ profit more than reducing the output. This is
because reducing the price will maintain the same amount of production costs as firms produce
the same level of output.
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An alternative explanation of the findings may be made in regard to the different level of
operating and financial leverage of firms that have different level of monopoly power. Specifically,
given that competition forces firms to reduce capital investments and debt (Frésard and Valta,
2012), firms in competitive industries may have lower financial and operating leverage. That, in
turn, would reduce the influence of consumption fluctuation on firms’ return volatility, leading to
negative relation between competition and C-CAPM beta.20 When I control for the effect of
financial and operating leverage, the negative association between competition and C-CAPM beta
still holds, supporting the prior explanation.

I perform numerous sensitivity analyses to validate the findings. First, I apply a finer level,
which is the three and four digits, of Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) when I calculate the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). All levels of classifications provide the same result;
competition is negatively associated with C-CAPM beta. Second, I apply a different industry
classification, namely the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), and then
calculate the HHI based on it. The results remain the same where the competition remains
negatively associated with the C-CAPM beta. Finally, I study the several industries that witnessed
significant deregulation to examine the changes in C-CAPM beta. Since deregulation reduces the
barriers to entry and moves the markets toward competition, I test for the impact of the
deregulation on C-CAPM beta by examining whether deregulated industries experience a
reduction in the C-CAPM beta. The results corroborate our main findings as I find a significant
reduction in the amount of C-CAPM beta following these deregulation acts.
This essay is related to a few studies that developed a link between product market
competition and the expected return in equity markets. Lyandres and Watanabe (2011) show
theoretically and empirically that the compensation for bearing cash flow risk resulting from
competition in output markets is economically significant. In contrast, Bustamante and Donangelo
20 Taking on debt and fixed assets will increase the fluctuation of firm’s earnings to the changes in aggregate consumption due
to the fact that income must be paid regardless of the level of earning generated from consumption, causing higher C-CAPM
beta.
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(2014) show that firms in highly competitive industries generally have lower loadings on
systematic risk and earn lower asset returns. Their results are based on the fact that firms in a
competitive industry generate more of their value from assets-in-place instead of growth options.
This essay suggests an economic mechanism through which competition affects a firm’s exposure
to systematic risk.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents literature
review. Section 3.3 examines the link between product market competition and C-CAPM beta. In
sections 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6, I empirically test the relation between market competition and C-CAPM
beta. Section 3.7 presents many tests that examine the sensitivity of the findings to different
industry classifications and competition measures. The last section concludes.
3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW
The central insight of the consumption capital asset pricing model (C-CAPM) is that the
asset’s expected return is determined by the asset's beta measured with respect to consumption
growth. It simply argues that investors dislike stocks that pay low return during the period of low
consumption. Instead, they prefer to acquire stocks that pay high return when they are in need to
consume more. Therefore, investors can hedge against consumption risk by investing in low CCAPM beta stocks so that they can reduce the uncertainty of future consumption. Overall, the CCAPM model predicts a positive relation between C-CAPM beta and expected return. Common
facets of this model will be sketched next.
A representative investor seeks to allocate his/her wealth in different investments so as to
maximize future consumption utility. In accordance with the C-CAPM model, an individual’s asset
portfolio must result in an optimal consumption rate that has the maximum possible correlation
with changes in aggregate consumption (Breeden, 1979). Mathematically, this statement can be
represented as the following:
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Еt [uʹ (Ct+1) Rei, t+1] = 0

(3.1)

Where u (.) is the period utility function, C is consumption, and Rei refers to excess return of firm
i. This equation can be written as model of expected return as shown below:
Е [ Rei, t+1] = - Cov [m t+1, Rei, t+1] / Е [m t+1]

(3.2)

Where mt+1= uʹ (Ct+1) / uʹ (Ct) is the stochastic discount factor. The last equation indicates that
expected, or required, rate of return decreases with the positive covariance between utility of future
consumption, relative to the utility of current consumption, and future excess return. That is,
investors are compensated with lower (higher) return for stocks that yield higher (lower) return at
the time of higher utility of consumption. This is equivalent to saying that investors require risk
premium as compensation for holding stocks that pay low return during a period of low
consumption (when the utility of consumption is high).

Interestingly, Parker and Julliard (2005) find that C-CAPM beta predicts and explains the
risk premium of small size and low-market-to-book firms. According to them, these firms pay
higher risk premium because their return correlates strongly with consumption fluctuation,
especially during the period of low aggregate consumption level. In particular, firms of small size
or low-market-to-book pay low return during business cycle trough because these firms are more
distressed than others due to their small size and low growth opportunities. As a result, investors
require higher risk premium for holding these stocks to compensate for the risk of having low
return during economic recession, or during low aggregate consumption level. Yogo (2006)
examined the effect of consumption fluctuation on risk premium when utility of representative
agent is non-separable in nondurable and durable consumption. He argues that consumption of
durable products falls at recession periods, which in turn increases the consumption of the nondurable products. If consumption of non-durable products also falls during recession, then
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investors can not compensate for the lack of consuming of durable products, thereby increasing
the consumption risk.

Some studies document the effect of the covariance between consumption volatility, as
opposed to just consumption, and assets’ return on risk premium. For example, Tedongap (2014)
argues that investors are not neutral on the timing of resolution of uncertainty. That is to say,
investors dislike owning stocks that pay low return when the uncertainty of consumption is high.
He finds that the covariance between asset’s return and consumption volatility also explains the
risk premium.
This essay complements the growing literature that strives to examine the effect of
production market competition on many facets of corporate policies. That literature has examined
how competition relates to firms’ capital structure (e.g. MacKay and Phillips (2005), Lyandres
(2006)), payout policy (e.g. Grullon and Michaelly (2007)), timing of investment (e.g. Akdogu
and MacKay (2008)), risk management (e.g. Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell (2007)), executive
compensation (e.g. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) and Cunat and Guadalupe (2009)), the structure
of governance (e.g. Giroud and Mueller (2010)).
This essay is closely related to Subrahmanyam and Thomadakis (1980) who provide
theoretical relationship between monopoly power and systematic risk, and to the empirical studies
of Bernier (1987) and Moyer and Chatfield (1983). While these studies find that competition, or
lower monopoly power, increases the firms’ exposure to the systematic risk as measured by the
CAPM, this essay finds that competition reduces the firms’ exposure to consumption fluctuation
and hence the systematic risk.
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3.3 THE LINK BETWEEN PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION AND C-CAPM BETA
The different market structure in which firms operate may influence the firms’ behavior,
and the level of profits they can generate. In particular, if they respond differently to the changes
of market demand then the percentage change of profit would fluctuate by a different amount. For
example, raising the price of an output to accommodate the increase in demand, or consumption,
would increase profits by higher percentage than raising the amount of output. This is due to the
cost savings of not producing additional output. On the other hand, reducing the price would
maintain the same amount of production costs and thus bring down profits more than if the output
is reduced. To illustrate this point further, consider, for instance, a firm with the following
information:

A.

1
Output
100

2
Cost per unit
30

3
Price per unit
50

B.

100

30

55

C.

110

30

50

4
Sales (1*3)
5000

5
Cost of output (2 * 1)
3000

6
Profit (4-5)
2000

5500

3000

2500

5500

3300

2200

As shown, the firm normally, as presented in case A, produces 100 units of output at a price
of 50 and the cost of producing each unit is 30. In case B and C, the consumption, which equals
the amount of sales, went up from 5000 to 5500. For case B, the firm responded by adjusting price
to 55, whereas for case C the firm responded by adjusting output to 110. The new profit is higher
for case B than C by 300 which corresponds to the cost saving by not producing additional output
and adjusting the price instead. In case B (C), the profit has increased by 25 percent (10 percent).
When consumption goes back to normal level, price and output level should decline, as in case A,
leading to a decrease in profit. But this decline is higher in case (B), which is 20 percent, than in
case (C), which is 9 percent. It can be noticed that the change in profit is greater when firms respond
by adjusting price than adjusting output. If firms that operate in market structures, which are
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distinguished mainly by different levels of competition, respond differently to shifts in
consumption, then I can predict the association between competition and firm’s exposure to
consumption fluctuation.

As known, low competition allows firms to change price without inducing significant
impact on output. However, changing the price in a highly competitive industry would bring large
effects on output. For example, if a firm raises the price then consumers will buy the same product
from an incumbent firm. Moreover, firms in these industries are limited to the extent by which
they can reduce the price because their price-cost margin is low. Thus, changing price might not
be the optimal strategy for adapting to the changes in consumption in competitive market structure.
Cowan (2004) derived the conditions in which demand shifts may alter price and output. In
particular, he argues that additive shifts of the direct demand function raises the price and the
degree of that raise is a function of monopoly power. Next, I develop the argument more formally.

It is well known that what the consumers pay to obtain commodity is the source of the
firms’ revenue. Therefore, the amount of consumption must be equal to the amount of revenue as
shown in the following equation.21
Revenue =P (Q) Q = C

(3.3)

Where: P (Q) is price, Q is the output and C is the monetary value of consumption. Any change to
consumption may alter the price, output or combination of both. Let’s denote the consumption
growth rate by g and the average cost per unit of output by AC. Then profit (π) is given as follows:
π= Q [P (Q) – AC]

(3.4)

Let’s denote the profit level that results from changing output (price) as π Q (π p).

21

In order to make the analysis a bit simpler, I assume that there is not tax rate.
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π Q = Q [1+g] [p (Q) – AC]

(3.5)

π p = Q [(1+g) p (Q) – AC]

(3.6)

Adjusting output in response to the change in consumption would yield less impact on
profit than adjusting price. In fact, altering output would change the profit by the same percentage
of consumption growth (g), as shown in equation (3.7). On the other hand, altering price would
change the profit by a higher percentage than the consumption growth (g), as shown in equation
(3.8).
∂ π Q = Q [1+g] [p (Q) – AC] – Q [P (Q) – AC] = g
πQ
Q [P (Q) – AC]
∂ π p = Q [(1+g) p (Q) – AC] – Q [P (Q) – AC] = g
πp
Q [P (Q) – AC]

(3.7)

p (Q)
p (Q) – AC

(3.8)

Since Average cost AC and Price p (Q) are positive and P >AC, the term [p (Q) / p (Q) – AC],
in equation (3.8), must be greater than one. Hence, ∂ π p/π p is greater (less) than ∂ π Q/π Q if g
is positive (negative).

Equation (3.9) determines the new profit that results from altering both the price and quantity as
shown below:
π t+1= (1+g) (P (Q) – AC) Qt+ (Qt (1+g) – Qt+1) AC

(3.9)

This equation consists of two parts, first the new profit that results from only changing the
output and second the difference in profit between price-adjusting strategy and output-adjusting
strategy. If Qt*(1+g) is equal to the new output level Qt+1 then it means the firm has fully responded
to consumption change by only altering the output. In this case, the second term is zero. If Q t =
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Qt+1 then the firm has fully responded by only altering the price. Assuming that the consumption
growth (g) is positive, then if Qt*(1+g) is greater than Qt+1 and Qt does not equal Qt+1 then the
firm has responded to consumption change by altering both the output and the price. The term [(Qt
(1+g) – Qt+1) AC] will be larger in absolute value when firms react to consumption fluctuation by
altering the price.

The extent to which firms respond to changes in consumption by altering the price may
depend on their monopoly power. According to Lerner index, the degree of monopoly power is
measured by the dispersion between price and marginal cost or alternatively by the inverse of price
elasticity of demand. A higher price-cost margin or a lower price elasticity of demand reflects a
larger monopoly power. 22

Monopolists are said to have inelastic demand because consumers have limited choice in
buying products from other producers. Therefore, firms with market power possess the ability to
set the price without inducing significant changes in demand. Equation (3.9) can be modified to
reflect the extent in which firms can change price as shown below:
π t+1 = (1+g) (P (Q) – AC) Qt+ [Qt (1+g) – Qt] [1/ (1-E)] AC

(3.10)

∂ π = (1+g) (P (Q) – AC) Qt+ [Qt (1+g) – Qt] [1/ (1-E)] AC – [P(Q)–AC] Qt
πt
[P(Q)–AC] Qt

(3.11)

E denotes the elasticity of demand where E ≤ 0.23

22

For further details about the Lerner index, see Lerner, A. P. (1934). "The Concept of Monopoly and the
Measurement of Monopoly Power". The Review of Economic Studies 1 (3): 157–175.
23 The formula for the coefficient of price elasticity of demand for any product is: (Q)/Q / (P)/P.
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Differentiating equation (3.11) with respect to g yields the following:
∂(∂ π/ πt) = (P-AC) Qt+ [(AC) Qt/1-E]
∂g
(P-AC) Qt

(3.12)

The left-hand side of equation (3.12) is the variation in percentage change in profit caused
by a change in consumption (g) or alternatively, it reflects the C-CAPM beta. It can be shown that
the elasticity of demand (E) is inversely related to the C-CAPM beta. As a result, market
competition is negatively associated with the C-CAPM beta.

3.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

3.4.1 Methodology and sample
The dependent variable in this analysis is C-CAPM beta, which is a function of the
covariance between firm’s return and consumption growth. It is estimated as shown in the
following equation,
Rit- Rft = 𝛼 i+ βC,G CGt + βmt (MKt –Rft) + βSMB,t SMBt + 𝛽 hml,t HMLt+ 𝛽 MOM, t MOMt + ϵit

(3.13)

Where subscript t refers to the month, Ri is the return for firm i, Rf is the risk free rate. CG
is the consumption growth and βc is the C-CAPM beta. (MK-Rf), SMB and HML are the three
factors suggested by Fama and French (1993), MOM is the momentum factor. More specifically,
the factor CGt is the growth rate of consumption, defined as the first difference in log real per
capita consumption. The monthly real per capita consumption data is taken from the NIPA tables
available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. (MKt –Rft) is the market risk premium, which
is the excess return over the return on risk free rate, Rft, on the value-weighted market portfolio.
SMB is the size factor defined as the difference in the return on a portfolio of small capitalization
stocks and the return on a portfolio of large capitalization stocks. HML is the value factor defined
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as the difference between the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and the return on
a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks. MOM is calculated by subtracting the equal weighted
average of the highest performing firms from the equal-weighted average of the lowest performing
firms, lagged one month (Carhart, 1997). The three factors of the Fama and French model,
momentum factor and return data are all taken from CRSP database.
In the following empirical test, I consider the ability of product market competition as
measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index to explain the variation in the C-CAPM beta. The
empirical exercise is conducted on a data sample from the merged CRSP-COMPUSTAT database
for the period of 2002 to 2013. The initial sample consists of 102,309 firm-year observations.
Following Fu (2009), I exclude observations that have less than a fifteen monthly return
observations during a period of 36 months.24 The resulting sample is 869,74 firm-year
observations. I also exclude observations that have negative total assets, capital expenditures, cash
and sales. After merging the file to COMPUSTAT database, the sample is reduced to 744,84 firmyear observations. Finally, I delete financial firms (SIC 6000 – 6999) and utilities (SIC 4900 –
4999) because these firms are subject to different regulations. As a result, I delete 24,277 firmyear observations. The final sample consists of 50,207 firm-year observations.
For each firm in the sample, I run time-series regression, as shown in equation (3.13), using
the past 36 monthly excess return and consumption growth.25 I control for market, size, value and
momentum factors while estimating the C-CAPM beta (βc,t) because these factors might be
correlated with consumption fluctuation. For example, the correlation between market excess
return and consumption growth is approximately 22 percent and it is significant at one percent
level. Table 3.1 summarizes the main statistics of these factors. Panel A presents the descriptive
statistics of the monthly consumption growth, market excess return (MKt –Rft), small minus big
firms return (SMB), high book to market return minus low book to market return (HML) and

24
25

This exclusion was followed by him to estimate idiosyncratic volatility.
I run a time‐series regression of the past 36‐month returns following the study of Gasper and Massa (2006).
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momentum return (MOM). The mean of these factors is 0.0008, 0.006, 0.003, 0.002 and 0.001
respectively.

Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
This table presents the main statistics of variables presented in equation (3.13). Panel A presents the descriptive
statistics of consumption growth, market return excess return (MKt –Rft), Small minus big firms return (SMB), high
book to market minus low book to market return (HML) and momentum return (MOM). Panel B presents the
correlation coefficient between these factors. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level,
respectively.
Panel A : Simple Statistics
Variable

N

Mean

Std.
Dev

Minimum Maximum

Consumption growth

156 0.0008 0.00155 -0.00475

0.00465

(MKt –Rft)

156 0.006

0.04347 -0.17230

0.11350

SMB

156 0.003

0.02410 -0.05190

0.05850

HML

156 0.002

0.02355 -0.09860

0.07570

MOM

156 0.001

0.04908 -0.34720

0.12530

Panel B: Pearson correlation coefficients, N=156. P-values are in parenthesis
(1)
Consumption growth

(1)

(2)
(MKt –Rft)

(3)
SMB

(4)
HML

(5)
MOM

1

(2)

0.22094***
(0.0056)

1

(3)

0.03017
(0.7085)

0.36693***
(<.0001)

(4)

0.04323
(0.5921)

0.19185**
(0.0164)

0.16123**
(0.0443)

(5)

-0.03572
(0.6580)

-0.42492***
(<.0001)

-0.0700
(0.3845)
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1

1

-0.16320**
(0.0418)

1

3.4.2 Variables
- Explanatory variable

The proxy for product market competition is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of
concentration. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is equal to the sum of the squared market
shares of all firms in the industry, as shown in the equation below. I use different variation of HHI
by defining various levels of industry classifications. To achieve this, I use two, three and fourdigit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes.
2
𝐻𝐻𝐼 = ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑆𝑖

(3.14)

Where Si is the market share of firm i in the industry, and N is the number of firms. It can
range from 0 to 1.0, moving from a huge number of very small firms to a
single monopolistic producer. An increase in the Herfindahl index generally indicates a decrease
in competition and an increase in market power. Besides the product market competition I control
for the following variables that may influence the C-CAPM beta.

- Control variables

A. Liquidity
Fluctuation in consumption must affect the firm’s earnings, but its instantaneous effect on
stock return could be a function of the speed of information incorporation into stock price. When
the stock price reacts to information continuously the return will change more rapidly causing
higher return volatility. Indeed, Karpoff (1987) shows that trading volume is positively related to
the magnitude of the price change. As a result, firms that have higher liquidity may have higher
return sensitivity to consumption fluctuation because the stock price reflects the return change
more rapidly than low liquidity firms. Liquidity is measured in two ways: 1) Trading volume,
measured as the number of shares traded (item 28) divided by total shares outstanding (item 25)
and 2) Current asset ratio measured as current assets (item 4) divided by total assets (item 6).
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B. Market-to-book
According to Xing and Zhang (2005), the fundamentals of value firms are more
adversely affected by negative business cycle shocks than those of growth firms. Their
interpretation is that growth firms suffer less than value firms when their assets are not productive,
which could happen when aggregate consumption is low, because the return of the growth firms
is mainly derived from investments, whose value is derived from future production, rather than
from current production. On the other hand, in good economic times, e.g. when consumption is
high, growth firms are less flexible to produce more output to meet the demand of more
consumption because most of their funds are tied to investments rather than to production.
Therefore, it can be concluded that growth firms are less affected to consumption fluctuation than
do value firms. Hence, to capture the effect of growth opportunities on C-CAPM beta, I include
market to book ratio in the regression. I measure market to book ratio as market value of assets
divided by book value of total assets (item 6). Market value of total assets is measured as total
assets minus book equity plus market value of common stocks. Book equity is defined as total
assets (item 6) minus total liabilities (item 181) minus preferred stock (item 10) plus deferred taxes
(item 74). If preferred stock was not available, I use preferred stock at redeemable value (item
175). Market value of common stocks is defined as common shares outstanding (item 25)
multiplied by closing price at the end of each fiscal year (item 199).
C. Closing price
Gasper and Masa (2006) included the stock price to control for the impact of possible
microstructure noise on volatility estimates for low-priced stocks. The closing price is measured
by the recorded price at the end of each fiscal year (item 25).
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D. Financial and operating leverage.
Financial and operating leverage are expected to have a positive impact on total risk. They
magnify the effect of economic-wide events, such as consumption fluctuation, on firms’ return.
Hamada (1972) shows that the systematic risk of a firm's common stock should be positively
correlated with the firm's financial leverage. In particular, he argues that borrowing while
maintaining a fixed amount of equity increases the risk for investors. Similarly, operating leverage
causes more reliance on fixed assets for production and these assets require fixed costs regardless
of the amount of production and profits generated. Therefore, at a time of low demand for
consumption, firms will have to pay fixed costs of using these assets even though they may not
sell enough amount of output to justify paying these costs.26 However, at the time of high
consumption, firms may sell sizable amounts of output while fixed cost remains the same. Thus,
consumption fluctuation may have larger effect on profitability for high-operating leverage firms
than it does for low-operating leverage firms. The financial leverage is measured as total liabilities
(item 181) divided by total assets (item 6). The operating leverage is measured as net property,
plant and equipment (item 8) divided by total assets.
E. Dividend payout ratio
Generally, dividends are negatively related with risk because firms that operate under high
uncertainty would prefer to accumulate retained earnings by reducing dividends. Grullon, Roni
and Bhaskaran (2002); Julio and Ikenberry (2004) note that firms increase dividends when they
become more mature and less risky. Bergeron (2012) shows that the dividend payout ratio of a
stock is negatively related to its long-run risk, defined as the covariance between dividends and
consumption. Dividend payout ratio is measured as common dividends (item 21) divided by
income before extraordinary items (item 18).

26

It is even difficult for firms to reduce scale in short period of time.
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F. Firm’s size
Large firms tend to have low systematic risk because of their ability to diversify its assets
into different business segments. Amihud and Lev (1981), suggest that diversification is associated
with lower firm risk due to existence of multiple lines of business with imperfectly correlated
return. Thus, the firm’s size is expected to relate negatively to consumption risk, or C-CAPM beta.
Size is measured by the logarithm of total assets.

G. Profit margin
Generally, absolute change will have stronger impact on the percentage change in profit
when the level of profit is low. Consequently, the percentage effect on profits of a given percentage
change in consumption is greater when profit margin is low and so the profit margin is expected
to be relating negatively with C-CAPM beta . Profit margin is measured as earnings before interest
and taxes divided by sales.
H. Year and Fixed firm effects
The nature of business may have an influence on the sensitivity of return to consumption
fluctuation. For example, in times of low consumption, consumers may buy less luxury products
while maintaining the consumption of necessity products. Therefore, firms that produce the former
are more exposed to changes in consumption than do firms that produce the latter. Thus, I include
a dummy variable to control the fixed firm effect. The volatility of consumption may vary through
different time periods, hence I also add a dummy variable for each year in the given sample period.

3.5 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 3.2 presents statistics for the data used in the analysis. Included are the mean, median,
and standard deviation for each variable.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistic of the sample
This table provides descriptive statistics for the data used in the analysis. Included are the mean, median, and standard
deviation for each variable. The data set is comprised of 50,207 firm-year observations from 2002 to 2013. The Yearly
C-CAPM is the average of monthly C-CAPM beta, which is estimated by regressing monthly return on aggregate
consumption for the past 36 monthly observations. Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is equal to the sum of the
squared market shares (sales over total industry sales) of firms in the industry. The financial leverage is defined as
total liabilities (item 181) divided by total assets (item 6). The operating leverage is measured as net property, plant
and equipment (item 8) divided by total assets. Closing price is measured by the recorded price at the end of each
fiscal year. Trading volume is measured as the yearly number of shares traded (item # 28) divided by total shares
outstanding (item # 25). Market to book is market value of assets divided by book value of total assets. Dividend
payout is defined as common dividends (item 21) divided by income before extraordinary items (item 18). Profit
margin is measured as earnings before interest and taxes divided by sales. Current asset ratio is measured as current
assets (item # 4) divided by total assets (item # 6). ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10
level, respectively.
N
Mean
Standard
Q1
Median
Q3
Deviation
Yearly C-CAPM

50207

0.47015

8.27295

-3.3332

0.206878

4.02732

Herfindahl-Hirschman index
(HHI)
Financial leverage

50207

0.07904

0.07723

0.035763

0.049531

0.09588

50026

0.49797

0.61509

0.281959

0.464985

0.63688

Operating leverage

50139

0.25822

0.23894

.071126

.17286

.038111

Closing price

50191

54.9622

1840.22

4.150

12.380

28.030

Trading volume

50095

1.85654

2.32258

.513656

1.22255

2.42302

Market to book

49945

2.04354

2.69782

1.0811

1.4754

2.2403

Dividend payout

49923

0.20239

5.50168

0.00000

0.00000

.083312

Profit margin

49225

-4.65477

179.861

-.0224961

.0589432

.013145

Total Assets (million)

50169

5.02903

2.15669

3.462355

4.873562

6.44311

Current asset ratio

49163

0.50494

.05023

.07014

0.24903

.03082

The average firms’ return sensitivity to consumption fluctuation, C-CAPM beta, is .47. The
average competition level, as measured by HHI, in the sample period is .079. Given that this
measure is bounded between zero and one, we may consider the market as competitive. Yet,
different industries have different levels of competition. The highest competition level is found in
Chemical and Allied Products industry (the two-digit industry code is 28) with HHI that equals to
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.024. The lowest competition is found in legal services sector with an estimated HHI that is close
to one. Of course, the perfect measure of competition may not be empirically feasible given the
shortcoming of the data available.27 Nonetheless, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of
concentration is a commonly accepted measure of product market competition that has been used
extensively in the finance literature. 28

The average financial leverage is approximately 50 percent, the average market-to-book
ratio is 2.04 and the average operating leverage is 25.8 percent. Financial and operating leverage
may influence the variation of earnings after interest and tax as indicated by many standard finance
textbooks. Mandelker and Rhee (1984) demonstrate how the two types of leverage contribute to
systematic risk of common stock.

Table (3) displays the correlation matrix of the sample data. The highest positive correlation is
between financial leverage and market to book ratio with an amount of .39.

27

For example, Compustat includes only public firms and not the private firms. Moreover, there could be collusion
between firms that may not be captured by any competition measure.
28 Among these studies are: Comaggia et al. (2015), Journal of Financial Economics; Hoberg and Phillips (2014),
Journal of Finance; Giroud and Mueller (2011), Journal of Finance.
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Table 3.3: Correlation matrix
This table provides the correlation data between the variables in our main regression. The Yearly C-CAPM is the average of monthly C-CAPM beta, which is
estimated by regressing monthly return on aggregate consumption for the past 36 monthly observations. Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is equal to the sum of
the squared market shares (sales over total industry sales) of firms in the industry. The financial leverage is defined as total liabilities (item 181) divided by total
assets (item 6). The operating leverage is measured as net property, plant and equipment (item 8) divided by total assets. Closing price is measured by the recorded
price at the end of fiscal year. Trading volume is measured as the yearly number of shares traded (item # 28) divided by total shares outstanding (item # 25). Market
to book is market value of assets divided by book value of total assets. Div. ratio is defined as common dividends (item 21) divided by income before extraordinary
items (item 18). Profit margin is measured as earnings before interest and taxes divided by sales. Current asset ratio is measured as current assets (item # 4) divided
by total assets (item # 6). Size is measured by the logarithm of total assets. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively.
(1)
Variables CCAPM beta

(1)

(2)
HHI

(3)
financial Leverage

(4)
operating leverage

(5)
(6)
price Trading volume

(7)
(8)
(9)
Market to book profit-margin size

(10)
(11)
current asset Div. ratio

1

(2)

-0.0146***

1

(3)

0.01308*** 0.03363 ***

(4)

-0.00418

0.24841***

0.06543***

(5)

-0.00131

0.03791***

0.00182

-0.01193***

(6)

0.00606

-0.01673***

0.00196

-0.03458***

(7)

0.01284*** -0.07814***

0.39207***

(8)

-0.00724

0.01511***

-0.00739

(9)

-0.00871

0.03375***

0.03399***

(10)

0.01229***

-0.17514***

-0.10374***

(11)

-0.00473

0.00140

1

0.00207

1

-0.12137***
0.00588
0.06076***
-0.64575***
0.01261***

1
-0.01274***
-0.00486
0.00073

1
0.07089***
0.00017

1
-0.04438***

0.18208*** -0.03797***

-0.03980***

-0.11129*** 0.04157***

0.17197 ***

-0.00050

-0.00916**
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-0.00448

1
0.00538

1

-0.02156*** -0.17542***
0.00106

0.00852

1
-0.01505

There is a positive correlation between operating leverage and competition index (HHI)
with an amount of .248. This indicates that more competition, or equivalently lower HHI, reduces
the amount of fixed asset ratio. This supports the findings of Frésard and Valta (2012) who show
that firms reduce capital and R&D investment in response to intensified product market
competition. The highest negative correlation is between operating leverage and current asset ratio
with an amount of -.645. This is to be expected since there is a negative mechanical relationship
between these two variables; the higher the fixed asset ratio is, the lower the current-asset ratio
becomes. Overall, there are a number of correlations that are not negligible, but the variables are
far from perfectly correlated.

3.6 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES
In this section, I run regression between competition measures and the firms’ return
sensitivity to consumption fluctuation (C-CAPM beta) while controlling for other variables. I
consider two-digit, three-digit and four-digit of the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes
for this analysis. Since the two-digit code is the broadest industry classification it includes many
firms that may compete with each other but not necessarily share the same products. Thus, it
measures the competition at the broadest level. On the other hand, three and four-digit industrial
classifications include more industries but a lower number of firms in each industry, so they
include only firms that are more homogenous in nature and production. Table (4) shows the
number of industries and the number of firms in each industry. It can be shown that the number of
industries in the four digit industry classification is greater than in any other classification.
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Table 3.4: Number of industries
This table presents the number of industries (N of Ind.) and the average number of firms in the industry during each
year in the sample according to different levels of Standard industrial classification (SIC) code, which are two, three
and four-digit.
Year
Two digit
Three digit
Four digit
N of Ind.

N of firms

N of Ind.

N of firms

N of Ind.

N of firms

2002

63

72

237

19

368

12

2003

62

68

236

18

368

12

2004

62

66

235

17

366

11

2005

62

64

234

17

365

11

2006

62

63

233

17

363

11

2007

62

62

231

16

359

11

2008

61

62

229

16

358

11

2009

61

59

228

15

356

10

2010

61

56

227

15

358

9

2011

61

55

227

14

358

9

2012

61

55

228

14

356

9

2013

61

54

224

15

349

9

Tables (5), (6) and (7) show the regression of C-CAPM beta on competition as measured by the
two-digit, three-digit and four-digit industry classification respectively.
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Table 3.5: The impact of competition on consumption risk (C-CAPM beta) using two-digit
industry classification
This table reports the effect of competition as measured by HHI on C-CAPM beta based upon the two-digit industrial
classification. The dependent variable is yearly C-CAPM defined as the average of monthly C-CAPM beta, which is
estimated by regressing monthly return on aggregate consumption for the past 36 monthly observations. HerfindahlHirschman index (HHI) is equal to the sum of the squared market shares (sales over total industry sales) of firms in
the industry. Ln size is the logarithm of total asset (item 6). The financial leverage is defined as total liabilities (item
181) divided by total assets (item 6). The operating leverage is measured as net property, plant and equipment (item
8) divided by total assets. Ln price is the logarithm of closing price which is estimated by the recorded price at the end
of each fiscal year. Trading volume is measured as the yearly number of shares traded (item 28) divided by total shares
outstanding (item 25). Market to book is market value of assets divided by book value of total assets. Dividend payout
is defined as common dividends (item 21) divided by income before extraordinary items (item 18). Profit margin is
measured as earnings before interest and taxes divided by sales. Current asset ratio is measured as current assets (item
4) divided by total assets (item 6). The standard deviation of errors is shown in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively.
Dependent variable = C-CAPM beta
(using two-digit industry classification)

HHI

(1)
6.0481***
(1.596)

Ln(HHI) t

(2)

(3)

1.3139***
(0.2043)

(HHI) t-1

3.552**
(1.702)

Ln (HHI) t-1
Ln asset

0.00981

Financial Leverage

0.0773
(0.077)
0.887
(0.573)
0.0016
(0.001)
0.3129***
(0.0538)
-0.0228
(0.0200)
-0.0037
(0.0059)
0.0001
(0.0002)
1.4394***
(0.382)
Firm, Year
0.424
47,844

Operating leverage
Ln price
Ln trading volume
Market to book
Dividend ratio
Profit margin
Current asset ratio
Fixed effects
Adjusted R-square
N

(4)

0.0069
(0.0763)
0.0743
(0.0771)
0.995*
(0.5734)
0.0017
(0.0015)
0.3008***
(0.0538)
-0.0221
(0.0200)
-0.0039
(0.0059)
0.0001
(0.0002)
1.4399***
(0.3822)
Firm, Year
0.4243
47,844
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-0.1503*
(0.085)
0.111
(0.080)
0.4839
(0.6359)
0.0013
(0.0016)
0.3458***
(0.0592)
-0.0460**
(0.0222)
-0.0032
(0.006)
0.0002
(0.0002)
1.2733***
(0.4185)
Firm, Year
0.3915
40,928

0.378*
(0.2255)
-0.1521*
(0.085)
0.1122
(0.08)
0.513
(0.513)
0.0013
(0.0016)
0.346***
(0.059)
-0.046**
(0.0222)
-0.0032
(0.006)
0.0002
(0.0002)
1.277***
(0.418)
Firm, Year
0.392
40,928

Table 3.6: The impact of competition on consumption risk (C-CAPM beta) using three-digit
industry classification
This table reports the effect of competition as measured by HHI on C-CAPM beta based on the three-digit industrial
classification. The dependent variable is yearly C-CAPM defined as the average of monthly C-CAPM beta, which is
estimated by regressing monthly return on aggregate consumption for the past 36 monthly observations. HerfindahlHirschman index (HHI) is equal to the sum of the squared market shares (sales over total industry sales) of firms in
the industry. Ln size is the logarithm of total asset (item 6). The financial leverage is defined as total liabilities (item
181) divided by total assets (item 6). The operating leverage is measured as net property, plant and equipment (item
8) divided by total assets. Ln price is the logarithm of closing price which is estimated by the recorded price at the end
of each fiscal year. Trading volume is measured as the yearly number of shares traded (item # 28) divided by total
shares outstanding (item # 25). Market to book is market value of assets divided by book value of total assets. Dividend
payout is defined as common dividends (item 21) divided by income before extraordinary items (item 18). Profit
margin is measured as earnings before interest and taxes divided by sales. Current asset ratio is measured as current
assets (item # 4) divided by total assets (item # 6). The standard deviation of errors is shown in parentheses. ***, **,
* indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively.
Dependent variable = C-CAPM beta (using
three-digit industry classification)
(1)
HHI

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.5035
(0.7503)

Ln(HHI) t

0.6368***
(0.1963)

(HHI) t-1

1.0176
(0.8148)

Ln (HHI) t-1

0.3995*
(0.2178)

Ln asset
Financial Leverage
Operating leverage
Ln price
Ln trading volume
Market to book
Dividend ratio

0.0119

0.0066

-0.1497*

-0.1530*

(0.0764)

(0.0763)

(0.0853)

(0.0853)

0.0812
(0.0772)

0.0783
(0.0772)

0.11208
(0.0803)

0.1117
(0.0802)

0.8942

0.9391

0.5018

0.51702

(0.5736)

(0.5736)

(0.6360)

(0.6361)

0.0016

0.0016

0.0012

0.0012

(0.0015)

(0.0015)

(0.0016)

(0.0016)

0.3212***
(0.0538)

0.3147***
(0.0538)

0.3489***
(0.0592)

0.3471***
(0.0592)
-0.046***

-0.024

-0.0231

-0.0461**

(0.0200)

(0.0200)

(0.0222)

-0.0035

-0.0034

-0.0032

(0.0222)
-0.0031

(0.0059)

(0.0059)

(0.006)

(0.006)

Profit margin

0.0001
(0.0002)

0.0001
(0.0002)

0.0002
(0.0002)

0.0002
(0.0002)

Current asset ratio

1.4615***

1.4313***

1.2845***

1.2739***

(0.3825)

(0.3825)

(0.4185)

(0.4186)

Fixed effects

Firm, Year

Firm, Year

Firm, Year

Firm, Year

Adjusted R-square

0.4237

0.4238

0.3915

0.3915

N

47,844

47,844

40,928

40,928
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Table 3.7: The impact of competition on consumption risk (C-CAPM beta) using four-digit
industry classification
This table reports the effect of competition as measured by HHI on C-CAPM beta based on the four-digit industrial
classification. The dependent variable is yearly C-CAPM defined as the average of monthly C-CAPM beta, which is
estimated by regressing monthly return on aggregate consumption for the past 36 monthly observations. HerfindahlHirschman index (HHI) is equal to the sum of the squared market shares (sales over total industry sales) of firms in
the industry. Ln size is the logarithm of total asset (item 6). The financial leverage is defined as total liabilities (item
181) divided by total assets (item 6). The operating leverage is measured as net property, plant and equipment (item
8) divided by total assets. Ln price is the logarithm of closing price which is estimated by the recorded price at the end
of fiscal year. Trading volume is measured as the yearly number of shares traded (item 28) divided by total shares
outstanding (item 25). Market to book is market value of assets divided by book value of total assets. Dividend payout
is defined as common dividends (item 21) divided by income before extraordinary items (item 18). Profit margin is
measured as earnings before interest and taxes divided by sales. Current asset ratio is measured as current assets (item
4) divided by total assets (item 6). The standard deviation of errors is shown in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively.

Dependent variable = C-CAPM beta
(using four-digit industry classification)

HHI

(1)
1.2796**
(0.5531)

(2)

Ln(HHI) t

(3)

0.6167***
(0.1593)

(HHI) t-1

1.0182*
(0.6042)

Ln (HHI) t-1
Ln asset
Financial Leverage
Operating leverage
Ln price

Ln trading volume
Market to book
Dividend ratio

Profit margin
Current asset ratio
Fixed effects
Adjusted R-square
N

(4)

0.00721
(0.0763)
0.0806
(0.0772)
0.9211
(0.5736)
0.0016
(0.0015)

0.0041
(0.0763)
0.0825
(0.0771)
0.9507*
(0.5736)
0.0016
(0.0015)

-0.1517*
(0.0853)
0.11326
(0.0802)
0.5142
(0.6361)
0.0013
(0.0016)

0.4127**
(0.1754)
-0.1559*
(0.0853)
0.1147
(0.0802)
0.5235
(0.6361)
0.0013
(0.0016)

0.3172***
(0.0538)
-0.0238
(0.0201)
-0.0035
(0.0059)

0.3148***
(0.0538)
-0.0246
(0.0200)
-0.0035
(0.0059)

0.3474***
(0.0592)
-0.0465**
(0.0222)
-0.0032
(0.006)

0.3458***
(0.0592)
-0.0471**
(0.0222)
-0.0031
(0.006)

0.0001
(0.0002)
1.4463***
(0.3825)
Firm, Year
0.4238
47,844

0.00016
(0.0002)
1.4348***
(0.3824)
Firm, Year
0.4239
47,843

0.0002
(0.0002)
1.2832***
(0.4185)
Firm, Year
0.3915
40,928

0.0002
(0.0002)
1.2787***
(0.4185)
Firm, Year
0.3916
40,927

The firm size variable (as measured by the logarithm of total assets) has a negative impact
on C-CAPM beta as shown in Panels (3) and (4) for all industry specification. This may indicate

96

that large firms have more ability to reduce firm’s exposure to consumption fluctuation. In all
cases, the financial leverage and operating leverage have the expected positive sign on
consumption risk, C-CAPM beta, yet the significance level is low. For all industry classifications,
dividend payout ratio has the hypothesized negative sign on consumption risk.
The most important and interesting variable in this essay is the coefficient of HHI. In all
panels for all different levels of industry specifications, the logarithm of HHI is positive and
statistically significant at one percent level. The amount of the coefficient is 1.31, .63 and .61 for
the two-digit, three-digit and four-digit industrial classifications respectively. Even if I use the
lagged logarithm of HHI as a measurement, the coefficient remains significant for all digit-code
industrial specifications. The results remain significant even with the inclusion of financial and
operating leverage into the regression, supporting my main explanation which is based on the
reaction of firms with different monopoly power to the changes in aggregate consumption.
Generally, the results indicate that monopoly power may increase the cost of equity by magnifying
the firms’ return exposure to consumption demand shifts.

Trading volume is related positively and significantly to systematic risk, C-CAPM beta.
This may be caused by frequent price adjustments that are due to the incorporation of new
information into stock prices. Therefore, liquid stocks may have higher price, or return, volatility,
caused by consumption fluctuation.
3.7 SENSITIVITY OF THE FINDINGS
In order to validate the findings, I conduct two sensitivity analyses that are concerned
with the measurement of competition. First, I analyze whether the findings are sensitive to industry
classification; to achieve this, I use the North American Industry Classification (NAICS) code,
which is also provided by COMPUSTAT, instead of SIC, to compute the Herfindahl-Hirschman
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index (HHI). Second. I use the deregulation acts as an exogenous shock in competition level and
test whether or not the C-CAPM beta decreases after the passage of these acts.
3.7.1 NAICS
HHI measures the competition based on the structure of firm’s sizes regardless of how such
firms are assigned to industries. Competition should reflect the closeness of firms to their operation
and products. Thus, assigning firms to their correct economic industry is vital for measuring
competition. Consequently, considering an alternative industrial classification provides suitable
mechanism to validate the earlier findings so I use the NAICS. Since firms may be assigned to
different industrial groupings, the NAICS could provide different values of HHI index than those
provided by the SIC. The NAICS was an effort to yield a more homogenous industry grouping
than the SIC system, Krishnan and Press (2002).

Table 3.8 reports the outcome of the regression between C-CAPM beta and HHI using
NAICS. The amount of HHI coefficient (logarithm of HHI) at time t is 1.527 (.836) and the amount
of lagged HHI (lagged-logarithm of HHI) is .832 (.42). The coefficient of HHI is still positive and
significant in all variable form specifications. The results corroborate my main findings in which
competition reduces the firms’ return exposure to consumption fluctuation.
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Table 3.8: The impact of competition on consumption risk (C-CAPM beta) using NAICS
This table reports the effect of competition as measured by HHI on C-CAPM beta based on NAICS industrial
classification. The dependent variable is yearly C-CAPM defined as the average of monthly C-CAPM beta, which is
estimated by regressing monthly return on aggregate consumption for the past 36 monthly observations. HerfindahlHirschman index (HHI) is equal to the sum of the squared market shares (sales over total industry sales) of firms in
the industry. Ln size is the logarithm of total asset (item 6). The financial leverage is defined as total liabilities (item
181) divided by total assets (item 6). The operating leverage is measured as net property, plant and equipment (item
8) divided by total assets. Ln price is the logarithm of closing price which is estimated by the recorded price at the end
of each fiscal year. Trading volume is measured as the yearly number of shares traded (item 28) divided by total shares
outstanding (item 25). Market to book is market value of assets divided by book value of total assets. Dividend payout
is defined as common dividends (item 21) divided by income before extraordinary items (item 18). Profit margin is
measured as earnings before interest and taxes divided by sales. Current asset ratio is measured as current assets (item
4) divided by total assets (item 6). The standard deviation of errors is shown in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively.
C-CAPM beta (using NAICS industrial classification)
(1)
HHI

(2)

(3)

(4)

1.52702***
(0.46239)

Ln(HHI) t

0.836498***
(0.160107)

(HHI) t-1

0.8328028*
(0.50709)

Ln (HHI) t-1

0.420422**
(0.177547)

Ln asset

0.00617

0.003432

-0.14766*

-0.151590*

(0.0763)

(0.076342)

(0.08528)

(0.085306)

Financial Leverage

0.080546

0.082885

0.11413

0.115367

(0.077193)

(0.08027)

(0.08027)

(0.08026)

0.936524

0.975168*

0.51371

0.521167

(0.57364)

(0.57357)

(0.63600)

(0.63596)

Operating leverage
Ln price

0.00157

0.0015634

0.001268

0.001274

(0.00158)

(0.001589)

(0.00166)

(0.001668)

0.31795***

0.3171082***

0.350260***

0.349273***

(0.05382)

(0.0538019)

(0.05922)

(0.059218)

-0.023941

-0.025037

-0.04683**

-0.047531**

(0.020085)

(0.0200822)

(0.02227)

(0.02227)

-0.00347

-0.00344

-0.00311

-0.003097

(0.005906)

(0.005905)

(0.00609)

(0.00609)

0.00016

0.0001626

0.000202

0.0002

(0.00021)

(0.000218)

(0.00021)

(0.000219)

1.46536***

1.47109571***

1.284030***

1.471095***

(0.38239)

(0.382316)

(0.41836)

(0.38231)

Fixed effects

Firm, Year

Firm, Year

Firm, Year

Firm, Year

Adjusted R-square

0.42388

0.424118

0.391841

0.3916

N

47844

47844

40923

40922

Ln trading volume
Market to book
Dividend ratio
Profit margin
Current asset ratio
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3.7.2 Evidence from industrial deregulation

Several industry sectors have experienced significant deregulation over the past years.
Since deregulation reduces the barriers to entry and moves the markets toward competition, I test
for the impact of the deregulation on consumption risk by examining whether firms in deregulated
industries experience an increase or decrease in C-CAPM beta. In this regard, the best cases come
from industries that were subject to deregulation acts that increased substantially their degree of
competitiveness. The industries that I use are identified as the following:

The U.S. electric industry was deregulated and opened to competition in 1992. The Energy
Policy Act of 1992 eliminated obstacles for wholesale electricity competition, giving consumers
the power to choose their electricity provider. The SIC code for this industry is 4911 and 5063.

Natural gas industry was effectivity deregulated in 1985. Subsequently, many independent
companies started marketing and transporting natural gas. The SIC code for this industry is 49224924.
Telecommunications Act of 1996 is considered a milestone in the Telecommunication
industry that reduced regulatory barriers to entry and promoted competition. It mandates
interconnection of telecommunications networks, unbundling, non-discrimination, and cost-based
pricing of leased parts of the network, so that competitors can enter easily and compete component
by component as well as service by service, Economides (1999).The SIC code for this industry is
48.

Transportation industry witnessed a significant deregulation in 1980 through the Staggers
Rail Act and the Motor Carrier Act. The dominant common theme of these Acts was to lessen
barriers to entry in transport markets and promote more independent, competitive pricing among
transport service providers, substituting the freed-up competitive market forces for detailed
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regulatory control of entry, exit, and price making in transport markets, Moosa and Ramiah (2014).
The SIC code for this industry is 4011, 4013, 4731, 4213.

Table 3.9 shows the pre deregulation and post deregulation averages of the average CCAPM beta for the mentioned above industries.

Table 3.9: C-CAPM beta and deregulation
This table presents averages and medians of the C-CAPM beta for industries that were subject to severe one-period deregulation
shocks that meant to enhance competition. The U.S. electric industry was deregulated in 1992 through the Energy Policy Act.
Natural gas industry was effectivity deregulated in 1985. Telecommunications industry was deregulated in 1996. Transportation
industry witnessed a significant deregulation in 1980 through the Staggers Rail Act. The t-test (Wilcoxon rank sum test) presents
a test of whether the average (median) C-CAPM beta in the deregulated industry has decreased significantly subsequent to the
passage of these deregulation acts.

Before deregulation

After deregulation

Difference

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Electricity

4.079

4.337

1.193

1.149

-2.886***

-3.188***

Natural Gas

1.211

0.278

-0.691

-1.081

-1.902***

-1.359**

Telecomunications

1.588

1.787

1.322

1.479

-0.3012*

-0.306*

Transportation

0.800

0.781

0.588

0.539

-0.212

-0.382

To add a more robust settings to our test, I change the method in which I measure the CCAPM beta. Instead of using a regression model framework, I apply Mankiw and Shapiro (1986)
method and estimate the C-CAPM beta as the covariance of return on asset i with consumption
growth divided by the covariance of market return with consumption growth. This way of
measurement is crucial for presenting a comparison of the C-CAPM beta at two points in time.
The increase or decrease in the C-CAPM beta could be due to time trend rather than industry
deregulation.
C-CAPM Beta = COV (Rit,Ct+1/Ct)/ COV (Rmt,Ct+1/Ct)
Rit = the realized return on asset i during time t,
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Ct+1 is consumption in period t+1. The monthly consumption measure is seasonally adjusted real
consumer expenditure per capita on non-durables goods.
Rmt is the market return estimate. I use the return on value-weighted market index provided by
CRSP.

In the above equation, the denominator serves to control for any market trend of C-CAPM
beta. Hence, the denominator can eliminate any time trend effects on our C-CAPM comparison.

The results in table 3.9 shows that the mean and median of C-CAPM beta significantly
decrease after the passage of industry deregulation in three of the four industries. For example, the
mean (median) C-CAPM beta decreases by .301 (.306) after the passage of telecommunication act
in 1996.

3.8 CONCLUSION

The aim of this study is to investigate the effect of product market competition on the firms’
return exposure to consumption fluctuation. This kind of exposure is considered a main
determinant of systematic risk and hence cost of equity. I argue that competition reduces the
exposure of firms’ return to changes in aggregate consumption, thereby lowering C-CAPM beta.
The argument is based on how firms with varying degree of monopoly power react to shifts in
aggregate consumption. If firms with monopoly power accommodate to the change in consumption
demand by adjusting price, as opposed to output, than do firms with low or no monopoly power,
then the profit volatility of the former is going to be higher than the latter.
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The empirical exercise is conducted on data sample from the CRSP-COMPUSTAT
Merged universe of stocks for the Period 2002–2013. First, I use the Herfindahl-Hirschman index
of concentration (HHI) to measure the competition at different levels of Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) codes. The two, three and four digits of SIC are used for this purpose. I have
found that HHI, which is inversely related to competition, is positively and significantly related to
C-CAPM beta for all the industry level classification codes. Second, I re-estimate the HHI based
on the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) and found that the HHI is still
positively related to the C-CAPM beta. Finally, I test whether industrial deregulation acts have
reduced the C-CAPM beta. I reach to the same results, where deregulated industries experienced
a reduction in the C-CAPM beta.
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Chapter 4: Summary and conclusions

Product market competition is of major importance in corporate governance and finance
because it affects the incentives of managers, the cost of capital and the investment behavior of
firms. This dissertation studies the impact of product market competition on financing and
investment decisions. The results of this dissertation are of great importance because they explain
the cost of equity and corporate investments which are key indicators for an economy’s
productivity and income.

The first essay investigates the impact of product market competition on the idiosyncratic
and systematic volatility. In particular, I seek to examine whether the idiosyncratic volatility moves
higher than the systematic volatility when competition intensity rises. Indeed, the results show a
strong evidence that competition increases idiosyncratic volatility by a higher rate than systematic
volatility. Moreover, I show that some components of systematic risk (size and market to book
risk factors) relate negatively, rather than positively, to competition intensity. Two explanations
are proposed for this essay findings. First, market power works as a tool that passes on firmspecific cost shocks to customers but is irrelevant to passing on the industry-wide cost shocks.
Second, firm’s competitive advantage in the industry is affected by changes in firm-specific costs
rather than by the industry-wide costs. The effect of firm-specific costs on competitive advantage
is expected to be larger when there are many rivals in the industry. These two explanations suggest
that competition may increase idiosyncratic volatility more than the systematic volatility.
The second essay examines the effect of product market competition on cash flow for
investments. Several recent studies documented that competition increases financial constraints
due to the high risk of operating in competitive environment. For example, Valta (2012) shows
that the cost of bank debt is systematically higher for firms that operate in competitive product
markets. I argue that the financial constraints associated with competition may hinder the firm’s
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investments. Consistent with this prediction, I find that competition reduces the investment of cash
flow in valuable projects when firms are financially constrained, indicating that the competition
exacerbates the effect of financial constraints and reduces the cash flow-investments. In addition,
I show that financial constraints of competition play a major role in alleviating managerial
overinvestment behavior. By not recognizing the influence of financial constraints, some previous
studies might have overestimated the actual role of competition in reducing overinvestment and
underinvestment.
The third essay investigates the effect of competition on the firms’ return exposure to
consumption fluctuation. I show, theoretically and empirically, that a higher competition intensity
reduces firms’ return sensitivity to consumption fluctuation. Firms with monopoly power
accommodate to the change in consumption demand by adjusting price, as opposed to output, than
do firms with low or no monopoly power. This in turn will make the profit volatility of the former
to be higher than the latter.
There have been many attempts to increase the market competition through different
channels (from deregulation to technological change and increased trade). Numerous articles
aimed to test the implications of implementing governmental polices that strive to move markets
toward competition. Yet, applying effective competition policy requires an understanding to the
effect of competition on many financial variables. This dissertation fills that gap by studying the
influence of competition on corporate investments and risk.
The result of the first essay indicates that competition increases the idiosyncratic risk
portion in total risk. Therefore, the average pair-wise return correlation between stocks in the
market will decline, suggesting that firms return will move more independently with each other.
Diversification between stocks would become more effective when the correlation is lower, and
so making the diversification strategy a useful approach that can help mitigate the increase in
idiosyncratic risk caused by competition. Generally, when competition increases, the number of
firms will also increase. A higher number of firms should enable an effective diversification which
may reduce the idiosyncratic volatility. These two effects that are associated with competition may
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lessen the impact of actual idiosyncratic volatility born by investors who hold well diversified
portfolio. As a result, the overall effect of competition on total risk can be explained mainly by its
impact on systematic volatility rather than by the idiosyncratic volatility.
Third essay contends that competition may reduce systematic risk as measured by the
capital asset pricing model (C-CAPM). The model states that securities with higher sensitivities of
returns to movements in real consumption spending have more systematic risk and should have
proportionately higher risk premium. Many empirical studies confirmed that securities with a high
consumption risk (or higher sensitivity to real consumption) have higher return and therefore
higher cost of equity. The essay finds that competition reduces consumption risk, indicating that
competition may reduce the systematic risk.
The second essay shows the impact of competition on cash-flow investments. One of the
main findings of this essay is that competition may encourage the cash-flow investments in
valuable projects only if firms are not financially constrained. When firms face financing
constraints, then an increase in competition intensity may exacerbate the effect of financial
constraints and consequently forces firms to reduce cash flow investments in order to build up cash
reserves. Developing sound financial system before introducing competition policies may alleviate
the underinvestment effects of the competition.
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